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Abstract 
This research is designed to investigate the contextual components utilized to convey 
sarcastic verbal irony, testing whether theoretical components deemed as necessary for 
creating a sense of irony are, in fact, necessary.  A novel task was employed: Given a set of 
statements that out-of-context were not rated as sarcastic, participants were instructed to 
either generate discourse context that would make the statements sarcastic or meaningful 
(without further specification).  In a series of studies these generated contexts were shown to 
differ from one another along the dimensions presumed as necessary (failed expectation, 
pragmatic insincerity, negative tension and presence of a victim) and along stylistic 
components (as indexed by the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count or LIWC). However, none of 
these components were found to be necessary. Indeed in each case the items rated as highest 
in sarcasm were often at the lowest levels on the putative “necessary” characteristic.  
The ratings were then used to develop an online reading task to investigate the effect of 
negative tension on the processing of sarcastic and literal statements.  Three groups of items 
were taken from the previous studies to form high negative tension; low negative tension; 
and literal statements.  Reading times for seven key areas were compared across the three 
groups and it was found that in two of the critical areas, the low negative items were 
processed significantly more slowly than the other two sets of items. The literal and high 
negative items however did not differ significantly in their processing times.  These findings 
support the predictions of direct access models and contradict the predictions of the standard 
pragmatic model of language processing.  The findings from the studies are seen as 
consistent with constraint satisfaction models of sarcasm processing in which various 
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linguistic and extralinguistic information provide probabilistic (but not necessary) support for 
or against a sarcastic interpretation.  
 
 
Keywords: sarcasm, irony, implicit display model, allusional pretense model, pragmatics, 
psycholinguistics, online processing, figurative language 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past two decades, irony has been increasingly studied by researchers in 
many disciplines (Gibbs & Colston, 2007).   The focus of this paper will be limited to 
the form of irony known as verbal irony, a figure of speech in which the meaning that 
is communicated is the opposite of the meaning that would be communicated if used 
literally.  In other words, when referring to verbal irony generally one is describing a 
linguistic expression that is the contrary to the reality that is being experienced, or at 
least it is comprehended as a dismissal of the position being expressed (Katz, 2008). 
For example if someone says, “Nice hair” to someone who has just received a 
horrible haircut, therefore intending to express, “Bad hair”, then this comment would 
be considered verbal irony (Gibbs & Colston, 2007).    
  Researchers over the years have proposed that sarcasm is a variant of verbal 
irony (Colston, 2000; Lee & Katz, 1998) and the emphasis in this paper will be 
sarcastic verbal irony.  Sarcastic verbal irony is seen by many as having the 
characteristics of verbal irony with the addition of the existence of a victim (Lee & 
Katz, 1998).  In their studies of verbal irony, many researchers have in fact asked 
participants to give ratings of sarcasm and not irony per se. (e.g., Colston, 2000).  
Moreover, Gibbs (1994) provides an inclusive examination of the psychological 
literature dealing with figurative language and finds that sarcasm is treated 
interchangeably with verbal irony.  In this investigation we will examine the 
contextual characteristics of sarcastic verbal irony, rather than simply verbal irony.    
More specifically, the paper focuses on the discourse context necessary to initiate 
comprehension of sarcastic verbal irony.   
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 One of the reasons that sarcasm has been of interest to a variety of 
researchers, ranging from philosophers, linguists and cognitive psychologists is 
because of the challenge it poses to those trying to develop a comprehensive theory of 
language comprehension (Colston, 2000), especially given the frequency of its usage.   
In sarcastic verbal irony one asserts a statement that expresses something that is 
contrary to reality but, does so with the expectation that the utterance will be 
understood.  This contradiction poses a theoretical difficulty: How do people 
understand such comments when there is a mismatch between the intended (speaker) 
meaning and the meaning of the words being used (utterance meaning).  This 
difficulty is compounded because the utterance meaning on the surface can, in 
principle, be a mismatch with intended meaning. 
Given that there is a mismatch between the speaker meaning and the utterance 
meaning, additional information or conditions would seem necessary in order to 
successfully convey the desired sarcastic intent.  One source of this additional 
information or condition(s) is, arguably, found in the discourse context within which 
the statement is embedded.  In essence, the question studied here will be whether 
there are necessary conditions found within the contextual discourse information that 
initiates successful comprehension of sarcastic verbal irony. That is, can we identify 
characteristics which define an ironic/sarcastic context or ironic/sarcastic 
environment in the preceding discourse that initiates a sarcastic verbal irony 
understanding?   
Several researchers have put forth theories pertaining to verbal irony 
comprehension relevant to the question addressed here. (e.g., Giora, 2003; Kumon-
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Nakamura, Glucksberg & Brown., 1995; Utsumi, 2000).  Contained within these 
theories, the researchers make claims (implicitly or directly) regarding the conditions 
that must be present in order for sarcastic irony comprehension to successfully take 
place (Gibbs & Colston, 2007).  The following section reviews these theories. 
 
Review of Verbal Irony/Sarcasm Theories 
 
Allusional Pretense Theory  
   According to the allusional pretense theory the necessary conditions to elicit 
conversational irony are allusion to failed expectations and pragmatic insincerity 
(Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg & Brown, 1995). These are conditions that, according to 
the theory, must be present within the greater contextual information provided in order to 
achieve the desired understanding of the ironic utterance.  
An allusion to failed expectation refers to a discrepancy between a certain 
expectation and the reality that actually occurs at a later time (Kumon-Nakamura et al., 
1995).  If we consider the example given earlier of the individual stating “Nice hair!” to 
someone who has just received a bad haircut, the expectation is that people want to get 
“good” haircuts when they visit the barber/hairstylist and the reality is that the individual 
on this occasion did not receive a “good” haircut.  By stating “Nice hair” to this 
individual then, the speaker is alluding to the failed expectation that the individual had 
desired a good haircut but in reality did not get what they were expecting. This would be 
an example of an implicit allusion to failed expectations in that the expectation for a good 
haircut was assumed, as a social norm, to be the desired outcome.  If the context 
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contained within it a statement such as “I am going to get my haircut today and it is 
going to be a great haircut”, then the ironic utterance of “Nice hair” would be considered 
as an explicit allusion to failed expectation (Colston, 2000).   
 The second necessary component  proposed by Kumon-Nakamura et al. 
(1995) is pragmatic insincerity, in which the speaker does not sincerely intend to 
communicate what his or her utterance is generally supposed to imply (Colston, 
2000).  This characteristic follows from the felicity condition, as originally discussed 
by Austin (1962) and later elaborated on by Searle (1979; see Colston, 2000): an 
assumption that a speaker, when performing a well-formed speech act, is being 
truthful or sincere in what they are saying (sincerity condition).  Looking again at our 
“Nice hair” example, according to the sincerity condition of a well formed speech act, 
when the speaker states “nice hair” there is an assumption that he or she means that 
they believe the individual received a nice haircut. However, when being ironic, the 
individual is not intending the compliment and therefore they are being insincere. The 
insincerity is described as pragmatic because it does not apply to the semantic 
properties of an utterance, but instead applies to how the language is used (i.e., the 
pragmatic level) (Colston, 2000).  To recap, according to the allusional pretense 
theory two necessary conditions for the interpretation of verbal irony are the presence 
of an allusion to failed expectations (implicit or explicit) and pragmatic insincerity on 
the part of the speaker.   
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Implicit Display Model (Utsumi, 2000)  
 A more recent theoretical approach, implicit display theory (Utsumi, 2000), 
provides an additional contextual constraint. Utsumi (2000) proposes a theory of 
verbal irony called the Implicit Display Model.  According to the implicit display 
model an utterance of verbal irony implicitly displays an ironic environment and it is 
proposed that verbal irony is a prototype-based category (Utsumi, 2000).   The claim 
by the implicit display model is that the identification of the ironic environment is 
done by “checking or inferring its constituent events/states” (Utsumi, 2000, pp. 
1781). 
According to implicit display theory, if a statement is going to be interpreted as 
ironic, it must be identified as coming from or being embedded within an ironic 
environment. Utsumi argues the ironic environment consists of three events:  
1. The speaker has a certain expectation (E) at time (t).  
2. The speaker’s expectation (E) fails.  
3. The speaker has a negative emotional attitude toward the incongruity between 
what is expected and what actually is the case.  
If the accompanying discourse context contains these conditions then the situation is 
surrounded by an ironic environment (Utsumi, 2000).  It is necessary, according to 
the implicit display theory, that for a statement to be considered sarcastic/ironic it has 
to be contained within such an environment (Utsumi, 2000).   
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The second key aspect proposed by the implicit display theory is that an ironic 
communication presumes the implicit display of an ironic environment.  This is 
accomplished when an utterance:  
1. “Alludes to the speaker’s expectation (E)  
2. Includes pragmatic insincerity by intentionally violating one of the pragmatic 
principles, and  
3. Expresses indirectly the speaker’s negative attitude toward the failure of (E)” 
(Utsumi, 2000, pp.1785).  
Implicit display theory attempts to describe the comprehension of sarcasm/irony 
by way of prototype category initiation.  More specifically, according to implicit 
display theory, we interpret sarcasm/irony by recognizing the statement as belonging 
to or being imbedded within an environment that initiates the category of irony or 
sarcasm.  The key claim of the implicit display theory, for the purposes of this thesis, 
is that in order for a statement to be seen or recognized as ironic, the surrounding 
environment or context should contain the particular cues that create the ironic 
context, which according to the theory are allusion to a failed expectation and 
negative tension. It should be noted that Utsumi (2000) is a theoretical article and no 
empirical support for his proposals is provided. One aim of the studies completed 
here is to subject his theory to empirical testing.   
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Presence of a Victim 
Dictionaries often define sarcasm as stating the opposite of an intended meaning 
especially in order to insult or mock a person, situation or thing.  In other words, sarcasm 
is often defined as irony with a victim (Jorgensen, 1996).   Indeed, Lee and Katz (1998) 
claims that sarcastic discourse requires the ridicule of a victim to distinguish it from 
ironic discourse.  There is a limited literature on the necessity for sarcasm to have a 
victim or specific target of the barb.  
Lee and Katz (1998) presented to participants various comments in which 
sarcasm was presented within a discourse context.  Of importance here, the passages 
varied on the presence or absence of a specific victim of ridicule, and the participants 
were asked to provide a rating of the target sarcasm on how good an example of sarcasm 
it is.  The ratings were provided on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very poor example) to 
7 (very good example).  In Experiment 1, Lee and Katz found that the manipulation of a 
victim accounted for more than 35% of the variance in the degree of sarcasm conveyed 
while in Experiment 2 the ridicule accounted for 38% of the variance in the degree of 
sarcasm conveyed (Lee & Katz, 1998).  Thus both experiments show a similar pattern in 
that the presence of ridicule aimed at a specific victim plays a significant role in 
conveying sarcasm. 
A subsequent experiment, by Toplak and Katz (2000), attempted to identify 
characteristics that made the victim salient to a sense of sarcasm. In this study 
participants again read target sentences embedded within a discourse context in which the 
target was a negative comment expressed indirectly through sarcasm or as a direct 
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criticism. Of most importance, participants were asked to consider the statements from a 
specific perspective: either as the person who uttered the negative comment, as the target 
of the barb or as a neutral over-hearer. A fourth group was not given any perspective 
information.  Each participant rated the target comment along a set of dimensions chosen 
to tap speaker intent and impact.  
The relevant results of Toplak and Katz  is that,  relative to a direct criticism, the 
“person who utters an indirect, sarcastic statement is perceived as intending to be more 
offensive, verbally aggressive, anger-provoking, and mocking.  The sarcastic message is 
also perceived as more insincere, humorous, impolite, non-instructional, and conveying a 
somewhat unclear message” (pp. 1470-71).  Basically, sarcasm was perceived as a means 
of verbal aggression. There was an interesting difference amongst those who took on the 
varying perspectives of speaker, recipient or over-hearer of the barb.  Inasmuch as the 
speaker perceived his/her comments more positively than people with differing 
perspectives.  The speaker felt relatively less negative and aggressive, while people 
taking other viewpoints saw them more so. 
Despite the differences noted above, there were no systematic differences in the 
type of intentions perceived by speaker and victim. Both groups saw sarcasm as a more 
negative form of criticism than when it is expressed directly, and both groups showed the 
same overall profile of intentions as being involved. The difference was, as noted above, 
the speaker perceived less overall negativity in the comment than did the victim.  
In summary, the theories reviewed here would argue that a sense of sarcastic 
irony to a statement involves a discourse context or environment that possesses all or 
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some of the following: a sense of (or allusion to) failed expectation, pragmatic 
insincerity, negative tension and presence of a victim.  
Empirical Investigations of the Necessary Components of Sarcastic Irony 
 To our knowledge, there is only one study that has focused on identifying the 
necessary components of sarcastic verbal irony mentioned above, namely a paper by 
Herbert Colston (2000).  Colston investigated two necessary conditions for verbal 
irony that were proposed by theories of verbal irony comprehension (e.g. Kumon-
Nakamura et al., 1995; Kreuz & Glucksberg, 1989).  The two necessary conditions 
were allusion to violated expectations and pragmatic insincerity.  In his article, 
Colston (2000) experimentally investigated the necessity of these two conditions in 
sarcastic verbal irony. 
 The first condition, allusion to violated expectations, as mentioned earlier, 
refers to the concept that the speaker of the sarcastic verbal irony must in their 
comment refer to a prior prediction, expectation, preference, previously made 
comment or social norm that during the ensuing events was violated.  The 
mechanisms for achieving an allusion to violated expectations in verbal irony are 
echoic mention, echoic reminder, elicitation, true assertion and pretense.  All of these 
examples have the common characteristic of illuminating some expectation, desire, 
social norm etc. that was not achieved.  As a result Kuman-Nakamura et al. (1995) 
used the broad term allusional pretense to describe all of these violated expectations 
(Coslton, 2000).   
The first set of studies done by Colston (2000) investigated the necessity of the 
condition: allusion to violated expectations.  In the first study participants were given 
10 
 
20 different scenarios and asked to rate how sarcastic the speaker was being with his 
or her comments.  The scale ranged from 1 (not at all sarcastic) to 7 (extremely 
sarcastic).  Colston judiciously manipulated the content of these scenarios such that 
they differed on the nature of the critical “sarcastic” comment (i.e., earnest negative, 
echoic, negative jest, and earnest positive).  Examples of each comment type as taken 
from Colston (2000, pp. 287) follow: 
Earnest negative – You and Julie want to go to a concert but neither of you have 
enough money for the ticket. She says “This sucks.” 
Echoic – You and Julie want to go to concert but neither of you have enough 
money for the ticket. She says, “This is great.” 
Negative Jest – You and Julie want to go to a concert and you both have enough 
money for the ticket. She says, “This sucks.” 
Earnest Positive – You and Julie want to go to a concert and you both have 
enough money for the ticket. She says, “This is great.” 
The main experimental question in the first set of studies by Colston (2000) was to 
see if the ironic interpretation of negative jest involves the interpreter of the comment 
to infer a violated negative expectation.  
Through the sarcasm ratings of the participants, Colston (2000) found that the 
negative jest scenarios were rated almost as sarcastic as the echoic scenarios (means 
of 5.11 and 5.62 respectively).  It was presumed by Colston that the interpretation of 
verbal irony relies upon some allusion to failed expectations.  When one gives 
positive assertions about negative situations this achieves an allusion to failed 
expectation by echoing commonly recognized social norms (Colston, 2000).  Colston 
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claims that this is why echoic comments would be rated as more sarcastic than the 
earnest comments.  Colston, basing his predictions upon the findings of Kruez and 
Glucksberg (1989), predicted that the negative jests would be rated as sarcastic but 
not to the level of the echoic comments.  However, both the negative jest and the 
echoic comments were expected to be rated as more sarcastic than the earnest 
comments.  Colston’s findings supported this prediction.  
Once it was established that the negative jest scenarios were seen as sarcastic by 
the participants, Colston (2000) set out to experimentally test to see if the negative 
jest scenarios were seen to include an allusion to violated expectations.  Colston 
(2000) did so by using the same scenarios as the previous study.  However, instead of 
asking participants to rate the level of sarcasm, they were asked to rate the degree to 
which each speaker expected the situation that they encountered.  
The logic behind this being that, according to Colston (2000), if the interpreter 
does not infer some level of failed expectations, then the previous claim that sarcastic 
verbal irony has a necessary condition of allusion to violated expectations would need 
revision.  In other words, according to Colston, if a listener is able to successfully 
interpret sarcastic verbal irony in an utterance without detecting an allusion to failed 
expectation within the surrounding environment, then the allusion to failed 
expectation claim being necessary for such interpretations would have to be revisited.   
The findings from the rating of expectedness did however reveal that the 
speakers were in fact surprised by the events in the scenarios (Colston, 2000).  In 
other words, the ratings supported the notion that the speaker was not expecting the 
events that occurred in the scenarios.  This result, combined with the finding that the 
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negative jest (and echoic) scenarios were also rated as sarcastic, supports the 
proposition that allusion to violated expectations is a necessary condition in sarcastic 
verbal irony comprehension according to Colston (2000).   
 The second condition investigated by Colston (2000) was pragmatic 
insincerity.  Kumon-Namamura et al. (1995) developed the term pragmatic insincerity 
to account for utterances that do not appear insincere on a propositional level, but do 
seem to be insincere on a speech act level.  In other words, the utterance is spoken as 
and presented as if it is a sincere comment, however it is intended as an insincere 
comment and the speaker is not making a truthful statement.  In the second set of 
experiments by Colston (2000), he investigated this condition of pragmatic insincerity 
by testing to see if pragmatically sincere comments would be interpreted 
sarcastically.  Colston asked participants to rate the degree of sarcasm they perceived 
in pragmatically insincere, pragmatically sincere, and earnest comments within 16 
scenarios.  The idea behind this study was that if participants only rated the 
pragmatically insincere comments as sarcastic, it would support the proposal of 
pragmatic insincerity as being a necessary condition of sarcastic verbal irony.  
However, if participants rated the pragmatically sincere items as sarcastic, then this 
would not support that notion (Colston, 2000).  The following are examples of each 
type of item used; taken from Colston, 2000, pp. 117: 
Item Examples: 
Pragmatic Insincere: Margaret was a very prim and proper person and she 
appreciated good table manners.  You and she were having lunch once, when a man 
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at an adjacent table let out a very loud belch.  Margaret said to the man, “I love when 
people belch at the table.” 
Pragmatic Sincere:  Margaret was a very prim and proper person and she 
appreciated good table manners.  You and she were having lunch once, when a man 
at an adjacent table let out a very loud belch.  Margaret said to the man, “I love when 
people don’t belch at the table.” 
Earnest: Margaret was a very prim and proper person and she appreciated good 
table manners.  You and she were having lunch once, when a man at an adjacent table 
let out a very loud belch. Margaret said to the man, “I hate when people belch at the 
table.” 
Colston found no significant difference in the level of rated sarcasm between 
the rating of the pragmatically insincere items and the pragmatically sincere items.  In 
other words, the items in which the speaker was making a truthful statement at the 
propositional level (I love when people don’t belch at the table) were rated just as 
sarcastic as the items in which the speaker was giving an insincere statement (I love 
when people belch at the table).  This result indicates, according to Colston (2000), 
that the condition of pragmatic insincerity may not actually be necessary for the 
successful comprehension of sarcastic verbal irony. 
Summary 
 The major purpose of the preceding section was to give an overview of the 
proposed necessary conditions that lead to comprehension of sarcastic verbal irony.  
In reviewing the theories, four conditions have been identified; negative tension, 
allusion to failed expectations, pragmatic insincerity, and presence of a victim.  
14 
 
Current Research 
The goal of the studies conducted and proposed to be conducted is to further the 
investigation of the necessary conditions for the successful comprehension of a 
sarcastic/ironic utterance and their impact on the processing of sarcastic utterances.  
One of the ways that this investigation into the topic will differ from those of the past 
is the experimental task utilized in the main study.  In previous research investigating 
verbal sarcastic/ironic statements, items were created, presented in reading tasks in 
which participants then rated level of sarcasm or some other dependent variable (e.g. 
Colston, 2000; Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg & Brown, 1995).  In other words, the 
context and the target statements embedded within those contexts were created and 
developed by the researchers beforehand.   
One of the goals of this research is to present a task that enables the participants 
themselves to come up with the contextual components necessary to convey verbal 
sarcasm/irony.  This novel task allows participants the freedom to put into a generated 
context what they see as sufficient and necessary characteristics to convey an 
understandable sarcastic utterance.  In other words, the task used in the first study of 
this research will not be restricted by the researchers predetermining the sarcastic 
contexts, but rather give participants the opportunity to include the contextual 
conditions they would deem must be present to understand an utterance as being 
sarcastic.  These generated contexts will then be investigated in subsequent studies 
presented here by subjective ratings, and objective analysis of the lexical items.  
Finally, a subset will be employed in an online reading task.  The aims are twofold.  
The first will be to test which, if any putative components are necessary for creating a 
15 
 
sense of sarcastic irony, and second to test whether specific theoretical proposals can 
be supported.   
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CHAPTER TWO: EMPERICALLY IDENTIFYING THE 
COMPONENTS OF GENERATED CONTEXTS    
 Traditionally, research investigating sarcastic verbal irony has consisted of 
providing participants with pre-written and controlled texts - controlled in the sense 
that researchers manipulate the presence or absence of certain features they deem 
important.  These techniques have proven useful in examining selected theoretical 
questions.  However, the use of pre-determined text also presupposes that these texts 
contain the characteristics of sarcastic irony without subjecting that presupposition to 
empirical testing.  In the novel task used here, participants are asked to generate a 
discourse context that they believe would lead to a sarcastic reading.  From the 
perspective taken here, these generated contexts can be analyzed to see what 
components are actually used to signal sarcastic irony and to answer the following 
question: Are there features added to context that invite a sarcastic interpretation? Are 
any such features necessary to create that sense of sarcasm?   
The data generation steps employed here are as follows.  The first step to 
develop this task is to gather a set of target utterances that one can subsequently use 
in a context generation task.  In this step the aim is to identify items that, out-of 
context, would be either unlikely to be seen as sarcastic or conversely, be commonly 
read as sarcastic.  Once a set of appropriate items are identified, the next step will be 
to include the items in a context generation task.  The results of the context generation 
task will then be analyzed to determine if participants include in their generated 
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contexts the components of discourse context deemed to be necessary by the existing 
and previously defined theories.  More specifically, the components are allusion to 
failed expectation; pragmatic insincerity; negative tension; and the presence of a 
victim.  The contexts created will be analyzed using both subjective (coded and rating 
measures) as well as objective (Linguistic Inquiry Word Count) measures to 
determine if the sarcastic contexts created differ from the literal contexts that are 
created.  
Creating a set of target items for use in the context generation task 
To examine the effect of context on the level of sarcastic verbal irony, one 
requires a set of items for out-of-context occurrence that is perceived as neither 
conventionally sarcastic nor non-sarcastic when used as a sarcastic utterance.  That is, 
the ideal situation would be for the target sentences to fall in the mid-range of a 
conventionality sarcasm-rating scale and could, thus, be biased towards a literal or 
ironic use by the nature of the discourse context.  Consequently, a set of items were 
rated on an 8 point scale  in which a score of 0 referred to not conventionally used 
sarcastically at all and a score of 7 referred to the item being highly conventionally 
used sarcastically.  A second rating was also included: Ease of context creation.  The 
logic for this rating is that if an item is perceived as being too easily put into context it 
could be a result of being too strongly associated with a particular sarcastic context 
(which could be considered as akin to highly conventional).  If an item was 
consistently rated as very difficult to place into context, it could be argued that the 
item is confusing or too difficult to associate with any sarcastic meaning or context.   
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Participants 
  Eighty-two participants were tested; (45 females); the average age of the 
complete sample is 20 years.  The participants were undergraduate students enrolled in an 
Introductory Psychology course at the University of Western Ontario.  The students 
received one half-credit (30 minutes) towards their course requirements for their 
participation.  
Rating Scales, Instructions and Procedure 
  A set of items were rated on an 8 point scale measuring the degree to which an 
item is conventionally understood as sarcastic when out-of-context.  A score of 7 
represents an item that is highly sarcastic and 1 as not sarcastic at all.  Because of the 
nature of the main task, a second rating, ease of constructing a context, was also 
measured.  The ease of constructing a context measure was to measure how difficult or 
easy it would be to generate a surrounding context that would allow for the listener to 
know the comment was meant as a sarcastic utterance.    
Target sentences were collected from previous studies investigating verbal irony 
(Colston, 2000; Katz & Pexman, 1997).  Examples of these target items are “I did great 
on that test.” and “You are in a good mood today.”  Twenty-five of these target items, as 
well as 10 filler items, were rated using the two scales described above (conventionally 
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used as sarcasm, and ease of creating context).  The following is an example of the 
instructions given:  
Your task is to rate the statements in bold italics on the two scales provided.  The 
first scale is a rating of how often (conventional) the statement is used with a sarcastic 
meaning (stating the opposite of what the speaker intends).  The second scale is a 
measure of how easy it is for you to think of a context or scenario in which the statement 
could be used in a sarcastic manner.  
“I did great on that test.”  
How often is this statement used with a sarcastic intention?  
Never                          Always  
0   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
How easily can you come up with context to make this statement sarcastic?  
Very Easy                  Very Difficult  
0   1    2     3    4   5    6    7  
Participants signed up and completed the study online.  They were presented the 
target sentences with the two rating scales one at a time.  Participants worked at their own 
pace and, on average, it took approximately 25 minutes to complete the task.  
Results 
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On the 8-point scales, the average conventionality of sarcasm use ranged from 3.6 
to 4.3 and on the ease of constructing a sarcasm context scale from 2.8 to 3.4.  The 
average ratings did not differ from the mid-point (3.5) of the respective scales, t(81) = 
0.088, and t(81) = 0.352,  both ps > 0.05 for the sarcasm and ease of constructing a 
context.  Because the items were at the mid-range of both scales, it was deemed that the 
items were neither at ceiling nor basement and hence that the effects of inviting a 
sarcastic context could be appropriately studied using this item set.  
Experiment 1: Context generation under two instructional sets 
The 25 items described above were placed in minimal context, and participants 
were asked to construct a more elaborate context making the target sentence be 
understood simply as “meaningful” (the Open control condition) or as “sarcastic” (the 
Experimental condition).  The aim was to see whether the instructional manipulations 
led to differences in the nature of the contexts that were produced.  In essence, the 
aim here was to empirically determine the contextual characteristics that our 
participants generated distinguishing sarcastic from non-sarcastic sentences.  Analysis 
of the control condition will indicate whether some sentences will be used as sarcasm, 
even though previously rated as mid-line conventional in sarcastic usage, and even 
when participants are not instructed to do so. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
 Eighty-four undergraduate students (54 Females and 30 Males) from the 
University of Western Ontario were tested and given 1 credit for their participation; 
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the mean age of the complete sample is 21 years.  There were forty-two participants 
in each of the two groups (sarcastic instruction and open instruction).  
 
Materials and Procedure 
 In this study participants were provided, in booklet form, a set of target 
sentences.  Along with each target sentence presented, there was given a minimal 
context.  An example of a booklet item looked like this: 
 _____________________________ 
Stan and Jennifer had just finished the exam. 
_______________________________ 
Jennifer turns to Stan and says,  
“I did great on that test.” 
In this example, the target statement is “I did great on that test.” and the 
participants were asked to create the necessary context to ensure that the statement 
was understood. 
 
The following are the instructions given to participants from the two groups: 
A) Open Instruction Group 
In each of the following stories a person says something.  Some minimal 
context is provided for the conditions or situation in which the statement was made.  
Your task is to ADD information to the context so that a naïve reader would 
understand exactly why the statement (in italics) was made.  For each of the stories 
we have added some blank lines. ADD information to any of these blank lines that 
you think would make the target statement completely understandable. 
 
 
B)   Sarcastic Instruction Group 
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In each of the following stories a person says something that was meant to be 
sarcastic.  Some minimal context is provided for the conditions or situation in which 
the statement was made.  Your task is to ADD information to the context so that a 
naïve reader would understand exactly why the statement (in italics) was sarcastically 
made.  For each of the stories we have added some blank lines.  ADD information to 
any of these blank lines that you think would make the target statement completely 
understandable as a sarcastic comment. 
 
 
Each booklet contained 25 items (the list is provided in Appendix A). 
The study took approximately 45 minutes to complete. 
Results 
 Given that there were 25 items and 42 participants per instructional set, over 
1000 contexts were generated for each set.  These items were coded for speaker intent 
as follows.  A coder, blind to the instructional manipulation, was employed to rate 
each item.  For the initial round of coding the coder was instructed to read each item 
(context plus target sentence) and for each of the items determine if the target 
sentence was intended as literal or sarcastic (a binary decision).  The few items that 
were seen as ambiguous by the rater (i.e. neither literal nor sarcastic) were 
categorized as “other”.  To ensure the reliability of this categorization, a second blind 
coder was given 15 booklets (375 generated contexts) from each of the groups to 
code, with the same instructions as the initial coder.  Almost 95% (94.3%) were 
placed in the same categories by the two coders.  To reiterate, the coders were not 
informed about the instructions given to the participants (sarcastic or open) and were 
not told about the goal of the study.  Given the high rate of concordance, the data 
from the first coder is employed and is depicted in Table 1.  
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Table 1 
Percentage of Items from both Instruction Groups (Open Instruction and Sarcastic 
Instruction) Classified into Each Category (Sarcastic; Literal; Other)  
 Sarcastic Literal Other 
Open Instruction 10 83 7 
Sarcastic Instruction 98 1 1 
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  As can be seen, the contexts that were produced differed under the two types 
of instructions provided.  One instruction group asked the participants to create 
“meaningful” contexts, while the other group asked for contexts that created sarcastic 
utterances.  It is also of interest that 10% of the items created in the open instruction 
group turned out to be sarcastic, despite not being specifically asked to produce a 
sarcastic context.  Recall as well that the items were in the mid-range of the 
conventionality of sarcasm and ease of constructing a sarcastic context ratings, when 
measured out-of-context.  Despite not being rated as a conventionally sarcastic 
statement (in isolation), some participants still chose to generate a context to support 
a sarcastic meaning despite not being prompted to do so.  We will discuss an 
implication of this finding in the Discussion section. 
Given that the instructional manipulation was effective in discriminating 
sarcastic from non-sarcastic use of an utterance, the items were examined further to 
determine correlates of this difference.  The next set of analyses examined 
characteristics that the participants put into the discourse context to invite a sarcastic 
(from a non-sarcastic) reading of a given item.  Both subjective and objective indices 
were taken.  The following section will review the objective measure and the 
associated results. 
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Do sarcastic and non-sarcastic contexts differ at the lexical level? 
The objective measure used for this analysis is a software program called the 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (Pennebaker, Francis & Booth, 2001).  The 
LIWC software analysis provides an objective measure of linguistic characteristics 
for comparison between the contexts generated by the two instruction groups 
(sarcastic vs. open).   
The LIWC analyzes samples of text on a word-by-word basis and compares each 
word to a dictionary divided into 74 categories. Some of these categories are linguistic in 
nature, such as identifying the frequency with which articles such as “a” or “the” are 
employed.  Other categories are based on normative ratings by a set of judges; examples 
of this type of category would be “negative emotion words” or refer to specific mental 
states such as being “tentative” (indexed by words such as “perhaps”) or refer to social 
processes, such as those indicating friendship relationships (indexed by words such as 
“buddy” or “pal”).  Although an admittedly crude instrument, the LIWC nonetheless has 
proven it can identify cases where people are lying (e.g. Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, & 
Richards, 2003) or of gendered language differences in usage by men and women 
(Newman, Groom, Handelman, & Pennebaker, 2008) among other findings.  
The authors of the LIWC have argued that the word count “… fails to appreciate 
sarcasm or irony” (Newman et al., 2008, p.217).  Although admittedly crude and 
recognizing that subtle uses of non-literal language especially might be miscategorized 
by the LIWC algorithm, we believe that the efficacy of the LIWC should not be 
discounted as a means of identifying contextual differences, especially in a situation such 
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as we find here, where the contexts have been generated to explicitly display sarcasm.  
Thus, the aim here is to see whether some of the effects found between generated 
contexts that invite sarcasm and those that do not can be attributed to the specific stylistic 
choices employed in creating the relevant contexts.  
To meet these aims, the generated contexts – at approximately two thousand - that 
were collected above were input into the L.I.W.C. 2007 program and analyzed to 
determine whether the contexts that produced sarcasm differed in the type of language 
employed from contexts that did not produce sarcasm. The items that successfully 
conveyed sarcasm were taken from the sarcastic instruction group and contrasted with the 
items from the open instruction group that were seen as literal in meaning. The output of 
the program is the percentage of words found in each of the 74 categories per total 
number of words in the text file.  
Despite the claim that the LIWC was incapable of identifying sarcasm, reliable 
differences between the two groups were found in 31 of the categories.  Because of the 
fact we were examining minimal contexts and thus might make salient spurious 
differences, we report here statistical differences only for those categories in which at 
least 3% of the total words fell into one of the two groups.  The categories that met this 
criterion are displayed in tables 2 and 3.  As can be seen, the contexts that invited a 
sarcastic reading differed from those that did not.  They differed in terms of linguistic 
variables and based on judged characteristics.  
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Table 2 
Means (in percentage) of the Significant Factors Between Sarcastic and Open 
Instruction Groups, for the Linguistic Processes Scale 
 
Linguistic Processes Scale Group 
Factor Examples Sarcastic Open F 
Negations No, not, never 4.17 1.33 39.83** 
Present Tense Is, does, hear 6.92 4.70 7.54* 
Personal Pronouns I, them, her 5.47 7.23 6.24* 
Auxiliary Verbs Am, will, have        11.72 9.83 5.88* 
3rd Person Sing. She, her, him 3.02 4.79 5.74* 
Past Tense Went, ran, had 8.76        10.49 5.42* 
Articles A, an, the 9.07 8.03 5.02* 
Pronouns I, them, itself 8.30        10.34 4.83* 
Prepositions To, with   9.26        10.93 4.76* 
* indicates significant at .05 level; ** indicates significant at the .01 level 
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Table 3 
Means (in percentage) of the Significant Factors Between Sarcastic and Open 
Instruction Groups, for the L.I.W.C Psychological Processes Scale and the Personal 
Concerns Scale. 
Psychological Processes Scale Group 
 Factors Examples Sarcastic Open F 
Negative 
Emotions 
Hurt, ugly, 
nasty 
4.88 1.22 91.07** 
Positive 
Emotions 
Love, nice, 
sweet 
3.56 6.44 32.70** 
Exclusive But, without, 
exclude 
3.35 1.39 23.49** 
Social Mate, talk, they, 
child 
9.84         12.07 12.59* 
Perceptual 
Processes 
Observing, 
heard, feeling 
2.48 3.34 8.06* 
Relativity Area, bend, exit, 
stop 
12.54         14.63 5.97* 
* indicates significant at .05 level; ** indicates significant at the .01 level 
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Although not directly tied to the putative necessary characteristics proposed by 
different theorists, several aspects of these data are intriguing.  First, the sarcastic inviting 
contexts contain more negations, more negative emotions and fewer positive emotions 
than the non-sarcastic contexts.  On face, this is consistent with the notion that negative 
tension is important in creating an ironic environment. Second, the sarcastic contexts 
contained more instances of present tense, and fewer of past tense, then the non-sarcastic 
contexts.  These data might suggest that relative to non-sarcastic contexts, the sarcastic 
contexts are more immediate or more frequently involve the activation of event structures 
that are being simulated as ongoing (see for instance, Ferretti & Katz, 2009, for 
examinations of event structures, verb aspect and autobiographical memories).  Finally, 
one can speculate that the higher frequency of exclusion terms in the sarcastic contexts 
are an index of failed expectations.  Naturally, one can only speculate on the reasons for 
the differences we observe here and studies designed to test alternative explanations are 
required.  Regardless, the presence of so many differences in what are, after all, minimal 
contexts points to the presence of stylistic differences in the discourse associated with 
creating a sense of sarcasm.  
 Overall, the key finding related to this investigation is that the participants who 
generated the sarcastic contexts used different words to support the target utterance 
and that on face, some of these lexical differences were consistent with theoretical 
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explanations as to how sarcastic and non-sarcastic contexts differ from one another.  
In the next section we address these theoretical contextual differences directly, by 
examination of participant ratings.  
 
Subjective Ratings  
The same two coders as used before were employed again.  This time the task of 
the coders was to classify the generated contexts for; allusion to failed expectations, 
pragmatic insincerity, negative tension and presence of a victim.  The coders were 
given the definitions of each concept, as used in the extant literature, and asked to 
indicate for each concept whether or not in their opinion an item possessed the 
concept being considered.  There was agreement on classification by the two coders 
on 99% of the items.  
As predicted by these theories, the contexts generated under the sarcastic 
instructions were more likely to exhibit an allusion to failed expectations (M = 24.28; 
S.D. = 1.01 vs. M = 1.64; S.D. = 2.03 in the open instruction group; t(82) = 63.286; p < 
0.01.), pragmatic insincerity (M = 22.6; S.D. = 1.34 vs. M = 0.88; S.D. = 1.47; t(82) = 
71.302); the presence of negative tension  (M = 23.4; S.D. = 0.85 vs. M = 2.49; S.D. = 
3.89; t(82) = 34.932; p < 0.01) and the presence of a victim (M = 20.47; S.D. = 0.85 vs. 
(M = 1.79; S.D. = 1.44); t(82) = 72.987, p < 0.01.  The means here refer to the number of 
items on average per 25 items that contain that contextual component generated by each 
participant.  For example, of the 25 generated items in the sarcastic instruction group per 
participant, 24.28 on average were rated as containing an allusion to failed expectations 
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whereas only an average of 1.64 of the generated items out of 25 for the open instruction 
group contained an allusion to failed expectations. 
 
 
Discussion 
 The findings from the above experiment show that the target sentences, when 
presented in isolation, were not seen as being conventionally sarcastic in nature.   
These same target sentences however, when surrounded by contextual information 
provided by the participants asked to create a sarcastic context, were later coded as 
being sarcastic by a naïve rater.  Our aim was to have items that were not too 
conventional one way or the other (sarcastic or literal) with the hope that 
accompanying contextual information could push the meaning to be either sarcastic 
or literal.  The findings indicate that our goal was achieved.  
 The findings from the context generation task showed that the contexts 
created by the two instruction groups differed significantly in both objective and 
subjective measures.  The objective measure showed that the participants used 
different types of words in the creation of the contexts dependent on whether the goal 
was to achieve sarcasm or just to make a meaningful statement.  The findings from 
the subjective coding showed that the components proposed by the models of sarcasm 
covered earlier are often found in the contexts created.  In other words, the subjective 
coding found that the proposed necessary components are often present in the 
contextual information that was generated by the participants.  The logical next step 
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then is to see if these components that are often present in sarcastic contexts are 
actually necessary for the successful interpretation of a sarcastic utterance, and data to 
this end will be presented in the upcoming chapter. 
The differences found thus far have demonstrated that sarcastic contexts and 
literal contexts differ in the components used to sway the meaning towards either the 
sarcastic or the literal.  The findings also demonstrate that participants are able to 
successfully create contextual information that conveys sarcastic meaning.  This is an 
important finding because it allows us to employ the more empirical context 
generation task rather than providing participants with pre-written contextual items.  
The following chapter will investigate whether the components proposed by the 
different models are indeed necessary to successfully convey sarcastic meaning. 
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CHAPTER THREE: IDENTIFYING WHETHER THERE ARE NECESSARY 
CONDITIONS FOR SARCASM 
 In the earlier sections we have demonstrated that items that out-of-context are 
not rated as sarcastic can be seen as such when placed in a context generated by 
participants to make the items understood as being intentionally sarcastic (relative to 
a comparison group).  We have also demonstrated that the generated contexts differ at 
the lexical level, at least by coders using a binary classification system in terms of 
perceived levels of violated expectation, negative tension, pragmatic insincerity and 
presence of a victim.  In this chapter we will again analyze the generated contexts, but 
now subject the contexts to ratings by a large sample of naïve raters along the Likert-
scale dimensions. The data so provided permits for an examination of the inter-
relations amongst the putative necessary conditions proposed in different theories, 
and whether which, if any, of the theoretical components are in fact necessary in 
producing a sense of sarcasm.  This section will pose two questions.  First, do the 
factors suggested by different theories independently predict level of sarcasm? 
Second, which, if any, of the suggested factors are necessary for producing a sense of 
sarcasm?  Once again, the five scales employed earlier are used: level of sarcasm; 
presence of a victim; allusion to failed expectation; negative tension and pragmatic 
sincerity. 
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Do the factors suggested by different theories independently predict level of 
sarcasm? 
Participants 
 Eighty-two participants were tested (46 females: with a mean age of 19 years 
old).  The participants were undergraduate students at the University of Western 
Ontario who participated as a requirement for Introductory Psychology and who 
received one research credit for their participation.   
Materials 
   The contexts generated in the context completion task were presented to the 
participants in booklet form.  Each of the generated contexts and target sentences 
were supplemented by the five rating scales used by the coders: level of sarcasm; 
presence of a victim; negative tension; allusion to failed expectations and pragmatic 
sincerity.   
Each participant rated one of the booklets created during the context completion 
task described in Chapter Two.  Along with the booklets of items, the participants in 
this study were given 25 pages of blank ratings to fill out.  The ratings were eight 
point scales ranging from 0-7.  The five ratings used were based upon the 
characteristics coded for earlier: level of sarcasm; presence of a victim; negative 
tension; allusion to failed expectations and pragmatic insincerity.  Each participant 
received a booklet containing 25 items.  The task took approximately 45 minutes to 
complete.  
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Participants were given the same definitions for each of the scale terms as those 
given to the coders. Examples of the scales are depicted below: 
Level of Sarcasm 
Not at all        Extremely 
 0 1       2              3        4  5     6      7  
Presence of a Victim 
Not at all        Clearly 
 0 1       2              3        4  5     6      7 
Negative Tension  
Not at all        Extremely 
 0 1       2              3        4  5     6      7  
Allusion to Failed Expectations 
Not at all        Clearly 
 0 1       2              3        4  5     6      7  
Pragmatic Insincerity 
Not at all        Clearly 
0  1       2              3        4  5     6      7  
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Results and Discussion 
The mean ratings for the sarcastic and open instruction groups and summary 
ANOVA statistics for each scale are shown in Table 4.  
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Table 4 
ANOVA results showing Rating level means, F values and significance levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sarcasm Instruction 
 
 
 
Open Instruction 
 
 
  
 
Factor 
 
  M 
 
  SD 
 
      M 
 
      SD 
 
      F 
 
   Sig. 
Level of Sarcasm 6.05 .83 1.82 .63 204.21 .01 
Presence of Victim 4.26 .74 1.37 .41 121.11 .01 
Negative Tension 4.53 1.18 1.53 .24 99.18 .01 
Failed Expectation 4.65 .92 1.43 .18 101.89 .01 
Pragmatic Insincerity 5.33 1.32 2.04 .79 111.07 .01 
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The data acquired in this section is comparable to the findings in the earlier 
coding section (see chapter two), however these findings are from a much larger 
sample (82 participants vs. 2 independent raters) and come from a more fine-grained 
measure (8-point scales vs. dichotomous categorization).  That is, we found that the 
proposed conditions are generally present in the sarcastic items and that the contexts 
created in the sarcastic instruction group differed from those created in the open 
instruction group.  The data collected here allows for an examination of the inter-
relations amongst the scales. Table 5 depicts the relation between variability in rating 
of level of sarcasm with the four other measures employed here. As can be seen, 
variations in degree of sarcasm is correlated moderately with each of the measured 
dimensions, ranging from r = .637 (pragmatic insincerity) to r = .784 (negative 
tension).  The conditions also correlate with each other (shown in Table 5), ranging 
from a moderate correlation (r = .452 for Presence of a Victim and Pragmatic 
Insincerity) to a strong correlation (r = .759 for Negative Tension and Failed 
Expectation).  
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Table 5  
Pearson Correlation Matrix for Sarcasm Ratings and Identified Components 
 Victim Pragmatic 
Insincerity 
Negative 
Tension 
Failed 
Expectation  
Sarcasm Level 
Victim  1.000 .452* .637* 
 
.590* 
 
.727* 
Pragmatic 
Insincerity  1.000 .520* 
 
.499* 
 
.637* 
Negative 
Tension   1.000 
 
.759* 
 
.784* 
Failed 
Expectation 
 
   
1.000 .769* 
*p < 0.01 (2-tailed) 
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A stepwise regression analysis was conducted in which the four key 
components (Negative Tension; Failed Expectation; Pragmatic Insincerity; and 
Presence of a Victim) were used to predict the level of Sarcasm.  The step-wise 
regression analysis was significant; F(4, 1941) = 1753.7 p < .001; R = .88, R ²  = .78.  
Table 6 shows the standardized coefficients partial correlations and significance tests.  
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Table 6 
Summary of stepwise regression analysis on Sarcasm using the other key components as 
predictors.  
Independent Variable R  R-square β t value Significant Change in 
Sarcasm Level; p < 
Negative Tension .784a .614 .267 15.13 .01 
Victim .837b .701 .287 20,23 .01 
Pragmatic Insincerity .865c .749 .226 17.77 .01 
Failed Expectations .884d .781 .284 16.94 .01 
      
a. Predictors: (Constant), Negative Tension 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Negative Tension, Victim 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Negative Tension, Victim, Pragmatic Insincerity 
d. Predictors: (Constant), Negative Tension, Victim, Pragmatic Insincerity, 
Failed Expectations 
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 Based on the results of the regression, it is apparent that each of the four 
targeted conditions (allusion to failed expectations, pragmatic insincerity, negative 
tension and presence of a victim) independently predicts level of sarcasm.  This 
finding supports the claim that each of the factors assumed by one or another of the 
theories regarding conditions necessary for sarcasm contributes independent 
predictability to ratings of sarcasm.  As such, the regression analysis supports the 
claims put forth by both the allusional pretense model and the implicit display model 
that the sense of sarcastic verbal irony is directly predicted by the presence allusion to 
failed expectations; negative tension; and pragmatic insincerity.  It also supports the 
argument that a factor in addition to those described in those theories is the presence 
of a victim.  These findings confirm that the presence or allusion to each of these 
factors is sufficient contributors to a sense of sarcasm.  These data do not indicate, 
however, whether each of these conditions is necessary to produce a sense of 
sarcasm.  The question of necessity is addressed in the next section. 
 
What Factors are Necessary for Producing a Sense of Sarcasm? 
In the following section, the ratings collected using the 8-point sarcasm scales 
will be analyzed in order to directly evaluate the predictions inferred by the major 
theories related to sarcastic verbal irony covered previously (Implicit Display Model; 
Allusional Pretense Model; and Presence of a Victim).  Each of the characteristics 
will be examined in turn to see whether or not they are deemed as necessary to 
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creating a sense of sarcasm.  The logic of these analyses is that sarcasm should be 
most apparent (or only apparent) when each of the necessary conditions posited by an 
extant theory is met.  Because failed expectation is a component of each theoretical 
position, it will always be a factor in the analyses below.  Orthogonal to the failed 
expectation factor will be a unique contribution of the other proposed factors, namely 
negative tension, pragmatic insincerity and presence of a victim respectively.  As an 
example, to support the implicit display model both an allusion to failed expectations 
and negative tension would be required to produce an ironic environment that leads to 
a sense of sarcastic irony (Utsumi, 2000).  For other theories, different components 
would be involved.  
The following section will review analysis done to test each of the theories 
separately, looking at the key conditions related to each model and measuring them 
against level of sarcasm.  The data for each comparison will be presented as follows: we 
will take each item generated in the context generation task and categorize them 
according to how they were rated in the rating task.  All items that were rated as 5 or 
higher on the scales used in the rating task will be placed into a “high” category and all 
items that were rated as 3 or lower on each scale will be put into a “low” category.  For 
example, an item that was rated as 6 on the negative tension scale will be placed within 
the High negative tension group.  An item that was rated as 2 on the pragmatic insincerity 
scale will be placed in the Low insincerity group.  By separating the items into these high 
and low categories it will allow us to directly test if having low or high levels of the key 
components changes the level of sarcasm associated with each item.   
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Due to the fact that each theory covered in this paper has the condition of allusion 
to failed expectation as part of the associated model, we have included that condition in 
each analysis.  Along with allusion to failed expectation, the additional key condition will 
be categorized into high and low for each model.  For example, negative tension will be 
included along with allusion to failed expectation for measuring the implicit display 
model.  Also included in the analysis will be the type of instruction variable (open vs. 
sarcastic).  This will create for each analysis a 2 (high/low failed expectation) X 2 
(high/low on a unique characteristic, such as negative tension) X 2 (items generated 
under sarcasm or open conditions) structure.  The sarcasm ratings given each item will be 
employed as the dependent variables in an ANOVA.  
The logic here is simple and analogous for those employed in studies examining 
whether there are necessary features of concepts (e.g., Hampton, 1995):  If conditions 
deemed necessary are in fact necessary, then those items rated at the top of the 7-point 
sarcasm scale would fall into the high-high group. It would not be expected, for example, 
to have items rated as high as possible on the rating of sarcasm to fall into any low group, 
and especially not into a low-low group (e.g., low failed expectation-low negative tension 
group).  The next sections will separately test each of the three theories covered in this 
paper; the implicit display model; allusional pretense model; and presence of a victim.   
Direct Analysis of Ratings for Implicit Display Model 
 In this section a more direct comparison will be made between the ratings 
collected and predictions put forth by the model of implicit display.  Recall that the 
two specific necessary conditions put forth by the implicit display model were an 
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allusion to failed expectations and negative tension (Utsumi, 2000).  In order to 
measure the predictions of this theory, all of the sarcastic instruction items were 
separated into categories related to the ratings received on the conditions of allusion 
to failed expectation and negative tension.     
A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the impact of negative tension 
and allusion to failed expectations on the level of sarcasm found in the generated 
items from the two instruction groups (Sarcasm vs. Open). The conditions of negative 
tension and allusion to failed expectations were divided into two levels (high and 
low).  Recall that the high level category is defined by ratings of 5, 6, or 7 and the low 
level category is defined by all items rated 3, 2, or 1, thereby creating the four groups 
being tested (High Negative Tension/High Failed Expectation; High Negative 
Tension/Low Failed Expectation; Low Negative Tension/High Failed Expectation; 
Low Negative Tension/Low Failed Expectation).   The number of items that were 
allocated into each of the four categories and broken down into their corresponding 
level of sarcasm is presented in Table 7.  The level of sarcasm means, standard 
deviations and number of items of each group taken from the sarcastic instruction 
items and the open instruction items can be found in Table 8.  
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 Table 7 
Frequency counts for Implicit Display category (Allusion to Failed Expectation and 
Negative Tension) 
1 = always refers to failed expectation 
2 = negative tension 
SARCASM LEVEL 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Implicit display 
        
   H1– H2 281 139 40 10 4   2 1 
   H1  – L2   52   26   5   6 1   1 Ø 
   L1  – H2   53   31 15   8 2   9 Ø 
   L1  – L2   40   21 11 12 5 12 9 
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Table 8  
Mean Sarcasm Rating, Standard Deviations and Number of item in each Group for 
the Implicit Display Model; 
Sarcastic Instruction items 
Group                                      M  SD    N 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
High Negative Tension          6.5    .81     474 
High Failed Expectations 
 
High Negative Tension          6.3   1.1     81 
Low Failed Expectations  
 
Low Negative Tension           6.1  1.3    103 
High Failed Expectations  
 
Low Negative Tension           4.4  2.7    131 
Low Failed Expectations                  
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Open Instruction items 
Group                                       M  SD    N                                        
__________________________________________________________ 
 
High Negative Tension           5.96  1.70    90  
High Failed Expectations  
 
High Negative Tension          5.48  1.12     21 
Low Failed Expectations  
 
Low Negative Tension          4.31  2.22    29 
High Failed Expectations 
 
Low Negative Tension           0.9  1.6    786 
Low Failed Expectations 
___________________________________________________________ 
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 The ANOVA showed a significant main effect for instruction type on sarcasm 
level F(1, 1729) =  106.54 ; p < .01.  The main effect for allusion to failed expectation 
on sarcasm level was significant F(1, 1729) = 227.89; p < .01.  There was also a main 
effect of negative tension on level of sarcasm F(1, 1729) = 214.31; p < .01.  The 
interaction between allusion to failed expectations and negative tension was 
significant F(1, 1729) = 72.96; p < .01.  The interaction between allusion to failed 
expectation, negative tension and instruction was significant F(1, 1729) =  14.16; p < 
.01. 
Discussion 
 The finding that items which were rated as low in both of the necessary 
conditions proposed by the Implicit Display Model also showed a significantly 
lowered level of sarcasm ratings would be considered supportive of the predictions 
put forth by the Implicit Display Model.  However, the findings from the groups that 
were rated as high in just one of the two conditions (while scoring low in the other) 
yet still showed high levels of sarcasm could bring into question whether or not both 
conditions are necessary for comprehension of a sarcastic utterance.  More 
specifically, if these two conditions are both necessary for sarcastic comprehension, 
then a low rating in either condition should result in a significant drop in the 
conveyance of sarcastic meaning, regardless of whether or not the other condition is 
rated as high.  The high frequency of items that have high ratings in both of the 
conditions proposed by the implicit display model supports the likelihood that these 
conditions will be present in a context supporting a sarcastic utterance, however the 
continued existence of a high level of sarcastic meaning when the level of one of 
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these conditions is low leads to a questioning of the necessity of the conditions 
proposed by the implicit display model in conveying sarcastic meaning.  
 
Direct Measure of the Allusional Pretense Model 
The next section will analyze the data in terms of how they relate to the 
predictions of the allusional pretense model.  Recall that the allusional pretense model 
claims that the necessary components of a sarcastic utterance are an allusion to failed 
expectations and pragmatic insincerity.   Once again the items were categorized into 
high and low groups. The resulting groups for this analysis were High Failed 
Expectations-High Insincerity; High Failed Expectations-Low Insincerity; Low 
Failed Expectations-High Insincerity; and Low Failed Expectations-Low Insincerity.  
Shown in Table 9 are the counts for items that were rated high and low for the two 
key components of the allusional pretense model and broken down by their associated 
level of sarcasm rating.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
Table 9 
Frequency counts for Allusional Pretense category (Allusion to Failed Expectation and 
Pragmatic Insincerity) 1 = refers to allusion to failed expectation 
3 = pragmatic insincerity  
 
Category 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
 
       
   H1 – H3 286 133 46 8 4 2 Ø 
   H1  – L3 22 23 23 15 4 2 2 
   L1  – H3 87 35 15 8 1 5 6 
   L1  – L3 4 4 3 12 6 4 Ø 
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A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was run to measure the impact of failed expectation; 
pragmatic insincerity and instruction on the level of sarcasm, in accordance with the 
predictions put forth by the allusional pretense model.   Similar to the previous 
analysis the conditions have two levels (high and low), the difference being that in 
this analysis the conditions being tested are allusion to failed expectations and 
insincerity.  Once again the factor of instructional group (Sarcasm vs. Open) is being 
measured.  The ratings were divided into high and low using the same method as the 
previous analysis.  The dependent variable is once again level of sarcasm.  The 
means; standard deviations on level of sarcasm and the number of items for each 
group for the sarcasm instruction items and the open instruction items are displayed 
in Table 10. 
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Table 10 
 
Level of Sarcasm Means, Standard Deviations and Number of item in each Group for the 
Allusion Pretense Model; 
 
Sarcastic Instruction items 
Group                                                       M  SD     N 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
High Failed Expectations                       6.46  .87    503 
High Pragmatic Insincerity 
 
High Failed Expectations                       5.83  1.45     72 
Low Pragmatic Insincerity 
 
Low Failed Expectations                        6.09  1.63    140 
High Pragmatic Insincerity 
 
Low Failed Expectations                        3.13  2.54     63 
Low Pragmatic Insincerity 
__________________________________________________________ 
Open Instruction items 
 
Group                                                      M  SD    N 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
High Failed Expectations                     5.85           1.82   47 
High Pragmatic Insincerity  
 
High Failed Expectations                     5.33             2.25   61 
Low Pragmatic Insincerity 
 
Low Failed Expectations                      1.24           2.02  281 
High Pragmatic Insincerity 
 
Low Failed Expectations                       0.8           1.63  366 
Low Pragmatic Insincerity 
___________________________________________________________ 
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There was a significant main effect for instruction type on sarcasm level  
F(1, 1525) =  321.04 ; p < .01.  The main effect for allusion to failed expectation on 
sarcasm level was significant F(1, 1525) = 696.1; p < .01.  There was also a main 
effect of insincerity on level of sarcasm F(1, 1525) = 96.69; p < .01.  The interaction 
between allusion to failed expectations and insincerity was significant F(1, 1525) = 
72.96; p < .01.  The interaction between failed expectation, insincerity and instruction 
was also significant, F(1, 1525) =  27.56; p < .01.   
Discussion 
Similar to the findings for the implicit display model, the finding that items 
which scored low in both of the necessary conditions proposed by the allusional 
pretense model also showed significantly lowered level of sarcasm ratings would be 
considered supportive of the predictions put forth by the allusional pretense model.  
However, once again the findings from the groups that were high in just one of the 
two conditions (while scoring low in the other) still showed high levels of sarcasm, 
bringing into question whether or not both conditions are necessary for 
comprehension of a sarcastic utterance.  More specifically, if these two conditions are 
both necessary for sarcastic comprehension, then a low rating in either the allusion to 
failed expectation or pragmatic insincerity condition should result in a significant 
drop in the level of sarcastic meaning.  Again, the high frequency of items that have 
high ratings in both of the conditions proposed by the allusional pretense model 
supports the likelihood that these conditions will be present in a context supporting a 
sarcastic utterance. However the continued existence of a high level of sarcastic 
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meaning when the level of one of these conditions is low leads to a questioning of the 
necessity of the conditions in producing sarcastic meaning, much like the findings for 
the implicit display model.  
 
Direct Measure of Presence of a Victim 
The final set of analysis for the direct measure of the theories deals with the 
presence of a victim.  Recall that researchers (Lee & Katz, 1998) have identified that 
having a specific victim of ridicule is a distinguishing feature for sarcastic utterances. 
According to Lee & Katz (1998) it is this directed ridicule and the identified victim 
that differentiates sarcasm from verbal irony.  Therefore this set of analysis focused 
on the presence of victim ratings along with the allusion to failed expectations.  
Shown in Table 11 are the counts for items that were rated high and low for the two 
key components and broken down by their associated level of sarcasm rating.    
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Table 11 
Frequency counts for each category for each theory 
1 = always refers to failed expectation 
4 = presence of victim  
Category 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
  H1 – H4 247 128 32 8 1 Ø Ø 
  H1  – L4 87 56 16 6 5 1 3 
  L1  – H4 75 29 8 2 2 2 Ø 
  L1  – L4 28 12 8 15 4 7 30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
 A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was run to measure the impact of failed expectation; 
presence of a victim and instruction on the level of sarcasm.  Similar to the previous 
analyses the conditions have two levels (high and low), the difference being that in 
this analysis the conditions being tested are allusion to failed expectations and 
presence of a victim.  Once again the factor of instructional group (Sarcasm vs. Open) 
is being measured.  The ratings were divided into high and low using the same 
method as the previous analysis.  The resulting four groups for this analysis then are: 
High Failed Expectation/High Victim; High Failed Expectation/Low Victim; Low 
Failed Expectation/High Victim; and Low Failed Expectation/Low Victim.  The 
dependent variable is once again level of sarcasm.  The means; standard deviations on 
level of sarcasm and the number of items for each group for the sarcasm instruction 
items and the open instruction items are displayed in Table 12. 
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Table 12  
 
Level of Sarcasm Means, Standard Deviations and Number of item for each Group; 
 
Sarcastic Instruction items 
Group                                                       M  SD      N 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
High Failed Expectations                       6.47  .87     416 
High Presence of a Victim 
 
High Failed Expectations                        6.14  1.45     174 
Low Presence of a Victim 
 
Low Failed Expectations                         6.42  1.63     118 
High Presence of a Victim 
 
Low Failed Expectations                         3.87  2.54     104 
Low Presence of a Victim 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Open Instruction items 
 
Group                                                   M  SD    N 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
High Failed Expectations                   5.84  1.82    69 
High Presence of a Victim 
 
High Failed Expectations                   3.95  2.25    41 
Low Presence of a Victim 
 
Low Failed Expectations                    4.96  2.02    25 
High Presence of a Victim 
 
Low Failed Expectations                    0.59  1.63   761 
Low Presence of a Victim 
        _______________________________________________________________ 
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Discussion 
 Once again, the finding that items which scored low in both of the targeted 
conditions (allusion to failed expectation and presence of a victim) also showed 
significantly lowered level of sarcasm ratings and would be considered supportive of 
the predictions put forth by researchers claiming that allusion to failed expectations 
and presence of a victim are necessary components of sarcastic utterances.  However, 
once again the findings from the groups that were high in just one of the two 
conditions (while scoring low in the other) showed high levels of sarcasm and this 
finding could bring into question whether or not both conditions are necessary for 
comprehension of a sarcastic utterance.  Consistent with the previous two analyses, 
the high frequency of items that were given high ratings in both of the conditions 
proposed supports the likelihood that these conditions will be present in a context 
supporting a sarcastic utterance, however the continued existence of a high level of 
sarcastic meaning when the level of one of these conditions is low leads to a 
questioning of the necessity of the conditions in conveying sarcastic meaning.  
Recall however, that researchers (e.g. Lee & Katz, 1998) have claimed that 
presence of a victim distinguishes sarcasm from verbal irony. Therefore it may be 
possible that the participants doing the rating task did not distinguish between 
sarcasm and verbal irony.  As a result, items that were low in presence of a victim but 
high in allusion to failed expectations could be ironic items that were just treated as 
sarcastic and as a result rated highly on the sarcasm scale.  
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 Another interesting finding comes from an overall comparison of the sarcastic 
instruction group ratings compared to the open group for all the key categories.  The 
open instruction group obviously had much fewer items that were considered to be 
sarcastic, however even when not prompted to come up with a sarcastic context, the 
rating means for three of the categories showed a very similar pattern as the sarcastic 
instruction group.  In other words, even without being prompted to develop a 
sarcastic context, individuals seemed to include some combination of the proposed 
conditions.  The analysis once again found that when any one of those conditions 
(allusion to failed expectation or presence of a victim) is rated at a high level it will 
result in a highly rated sarcastic interpretation.  When the conditions were all scored 
as low in the open group, the utterances were rated very low on level of sarcasm. This 
is likely due to the fact that the participants for those items were developing a literal 
context.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: GENERAL DISCUSSION OF FIRST SET OF 
STUDIES 
The findings from the analyses described in chapters 2 and 3 are clear in that the 
contextual characteristics generated under sarcastic instruction items significantly 
differ from the characteristics generated under of the open instruction group. 
Coding and subjective measures: 
 The coding results from the context completion task have demonstrated that 
participants consistently included the components proposed in the implicit display 
model.  Recall that according to the implicit display model, two of the key 
components were negative tension (on the part of the speaker) and allusion to failed 
expectations. The coding results could also be seen as supportive of the allusional 
pretense model due to the high number of items containing an allusional to failed 
expectations and pragmatic insincerity.  In addition, the coding results also showed 
support for the proposal that an allusion to failed expectations and the presence of a 
victim are consistently found in sarcastic context.   
 Results however from the larger subjective measure phase provide both 
supportive and potentially contrarian evidence to the proposal that these components 
are all necessary for the successful comprehension of a sarcastic utterance.  The 
support can be found in the results showing that level of sarcasm was correlated 
reliably with each of the components proposed by the theories and coded for in the 
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experiment (presence of a victim, negative tension, allusion to failed expectation and 
pragmatic insincerity).   
The result that can raise questions about the necessity of these components was 
the finding that items were sometimes rated both highly sarcastic and at the same time 
rated low (3 or less on the scale) on one of the other presumably necessary 
components such as negative tension or allusion to failed expectations. Moreover, 
although the correlations of the targeted conditions with level of sarcasm were 
reliable, they were only moderately high, sharing variability with rated sarcasm of 
about 25% at the best. Thus, it may be that the characteristics proposed as inviting 
sarcasm might be sufficient, but that any one by itself might not be necessary to 
producing a state of sarcasm. Perhaps a high level of any one of these components is 
what creates a successful comprehension of a sarcastic utterance. Alternatively, it 
may be that no one characteristic is necessary but instead what is needed is several of 
these components to be present before sarcastic intent is communicated. In line with 
this last proposal, items were occasionally rated as pragmatically sincere but at the 
same time extremely sarcastic, going against the proposal put forth that allusional 
pretense alone can create a state of sarcasm (Kumon-Nakamura et al., 2007).  An 
example of such an item is provided below.  
Example of Generated Items found to be high in Sarcasm and Pragmatic 
Sincerity: 
“Michael and Sandra are driving through the city. 
The car in front of Michael cuts him off without warning. 
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Michael says to Sandra, 
‘I love it when people use their signals.’ 
 
Items such as these did not appear often, however they were generally scored 
extremely low on the insincerity scale but extremely high on the sarcasm scale.  This 
is another example of the conditions proposed by the theories as being generally 
present but perhaps not necessary for sarcastic/ironic understanding.   
The findings from study 1 and 2 have demonstrated through objective and 
subjective measures that differences exist between the contexts that were generated to 
make an utterance sarcastic or not.  It is apparent that people will incorporate different 
conditions and characteristics into the contextual information for sarcastic utterances 
compared to literal.  The results from the studies described in Chapters 1 and 2 do not 
support the necessity of conditions proposed in the implicit display model and the 
allusional pretense theory of verbal irony comprehension.  The findings do support the 
importance of the proposed conditions but because one can find many instances in 
which the conditions are not met and still find perceived sarcasm it appears that these 
conditions are not necessary for conveying sarcastic/ironic meaning.  Finally, the 
findings from the studies presented above have provided us with a corpus of 
empirically generated test items that can be utilized for the investigation of the temporal 
processing of sarcastic/ironic utterances. One such study is presented in the next 
Chapter. 
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Constraint Satisfaction  
Given that our data indicates that the presumed conditions for creating a sense 
of sarcasm are not necessary, one can ask whether an alternative model will fit the data 
better.  Such alternatives would be models in which there are no single set of necessary 
or sufficient features but instead that comprehension of language in general, including 
non-literal and sarcastic language, involves utilizing all of the information that a person 
has at his/her command at any one point in time. With sarcasm this would include the 
variables identified here but could of course include other variables, such as tone of 
voice (e.g. Rockwell, 2000), facial expression, discourse markers, humour or, online, 
use of emoticons. 
 One way this general approach has been instantiated has been with constraint 
satisfaction models, a position taken for the other instances of non-literal language (see, 
for instance Katz & Ferretti, 2001) along with data emerging in the more general 
language comprehension literature (e.g., Spivey-Knowlton & Sedivy, 1995).  In such 
models, the focus is on the different variables (constraints) present in the context that 
may increase or decrease the activation of a non-literal interpretation relative to a literal 
one during the act of comprehension. The determination of meaning, in this case, a 
sarcastic meaning, is a competitive process. The meaning that emerges ultimately is 
that which is most activated (itself determined by the strength of the different sources 
of information available). Thus, as applied to the data presented here, a sense of 
sarcasm is activated to the extent that negative tension, failed expectation, presence of a 
victim (etc) all point to the same conclusion and the activation lessens as some of these 
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constraints provide competing interpretation (as would happen if there was, for an 
instance, a victim, but no failed expectation). 
 The studies covered so far have allowed us to directly test some of the claims 
regarding the necessary components allowing for conveying sarcastic meaning.  Here 
we consider the temporal processing involved in the comprehension of sarcasm.  There 
are several theories related to the temporal processing of figurative language, with these 
theories differing on whether we are obligated to activate certain information or not (an 
overview of these theories will be presented in the next Chapter).   
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CHAPTER FIVE: TEMPORAL PROCESSING OF SARCASM 
Over the last two decades, theoretical questions about the processing of 
nonliteral language have often employed reading time measures as a sensitive means 
of determining when the non-literal sense is accessed. The initial question addressed 
within this framework was whether the non-literal (e.g., sarcastic) meaning is 
accessed directly (given a supportive discourse context) or whether one is obligated to 
process the literal meaning of the statement before embarking on alternative non-
literal possibilities.    Some researchers have proposed that the literal version of the 
statement must be processed before the non-literal version (e.g., Dews & Winner, 
1999).  According to this viewpoint, individuals must first engage in an obligatory 
processing of the literal meaning prior to successfully processing the correct 
figurative interpretation.  This has become known as the traditional view, or standard 
pragmatic view, of language processing and is covered more in depth in a later 
section.  
Other researchers (see Gibbs, 1984; Giora, 2003) have proposed that factors 
such as contextual information or salience will determine which meaning is processed 
initially.  These direct access models claim contextual information directly invites a 
literal or nonliteral interpretation and one is not obligated to process either form 
initially. When exemplified by Gibbs (1984), the claim is that context can inform the 
interpreter to the extent that the figurative meaning (sarcastic in this case) can be 
accessed directly without first processing the literal meaning.  The graded salience 
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model (Giora, 2003), on the other hand, claims that we are obligated to process the 
salient sense of an utterance, despite the accompanying context (though context itself 
has an effect).  In some instances the salient sense is the non-literal meaning, as with 
highly familiar metaphor or presumably, expressions typically used sarcastically.    
The purpose of the study presented in this chapter is to demonstrate the utility of 
the irony production data produced and analyzed in the earlier chapters.  Specifically, 
the effects of negative tension will be examined. The next section will describe in 
more detail some of the theories dealing with temporal processing of non-literal 
language, and also discuss the potential role of negativity in the temporal processing 
of sarcastic statements. 
Overview of Theories Dealing with Temporal Processing of Figurative Language 
Standard Pragmatic Model of Language Processing 
 The traditional view of figurative language processing that has been prominent 
over the years is now often referred to as the standard pragmatic model.  According to 
this approach, an addressee is first obligated to process the literal sense of a statement, 
regardless of the accompanying contextual information, and only then seek a secondary 
(in this case sarcastic) sense if the literal meaning is incompatible with the surrounding 
context (see Katz, 2000 for a review).  The model suggests that a sarcastic utterance such 
as, “This room is totally clean”, is processed in three steps.  First, a person must (a) 
compute the utterance’s context-independent literal meaning; then the person must (b) 
decide whether the literal interpretation is the speaker’s intended meaning; and then (c) if 
the literal interpretation is inappropriate given the context in which it is embedded, 
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compute the figurative (in this case sarcastic) meaning by assuming the opposite of the 
literal meaning (Gibbs, 1986). 
Dews and Winner (1999) presented participants with examples of ironic praise 
and criticism on a computer and asked the participants to press a key as soon as they 
could identify whether the speaker was intending to convey something positive or 
negative.  As well as the ironic/sarcastic examples, they presented their literal 
counterparts.  Consequently, each sentence appeared as both ironic praise and literal 
criticism, or as ironic criticism and literal praise. Naturally, no participant heard the 
same sentence embedded within both an ironic and literal context.  The logic behind 
this design was that if the participants process the literal meaning, then the literal 
meaning should interfere with judging the evaluative tone of the ironic meaning, 
thereby slowing down responses to the ironic statements (Dews & Winner, 1999).  
They found results consistent with that prediction: participants took significantly 
longer to judge sarcastic criticism as negative than to judge the same statement used 
literally as a positive statement and were  slower to judge sarcastic praise as positive 
than to judge the same statement used literally in a negative sense.  Findings such as 
these (see also Schwoebel, Dews, Winner & Srinivas, 2000) support the traditional or 
standard pragmatic view of language processing.   
Direct Access Models 
  Gibbs (1994) proposed a direct access model wherein the information 
present in the accompanying context can immediately direct one to an understanding 
of the sarcastic target sentence, bypassing the need to first interpret the statement’s 
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literal meaning. In Gibbs (1986, Experiment 1) participants read figurative and literal 
comments in an elaborated discourse context, advancing at their own pace the 
passages presented to them on a computer monitor, one sentence at a time. Gibbs 
varied the passages by context type (positive and negative) and utterance type 
(sarcastic and literal), finding that the statements in the positive context were read 
more quickly than the negative statements. However, the reading times for sarcastic 
and literal sentences did not differ.  Gibbs took the equivalency in reading time as a 
disconfirmation that an obligatory access of the literal sense was not necessary.   
Naturally, these findings leaves open the possibility that, as a result of contextual 
information, the sarcastic interpretation can be activated in parallel with literal 
interpretation or that the context selects for a sarcastic expectation.  Regardless, these 
findings and others have been taken as indicating that people utilize the contextual 
information available to understand the speaker’s intentions in using sarcasm very 
early in processing. 
 A cross between the standard pragmatic approach and direct access can be 
found with Rachel Giora’s graded salience model. In this model, the reader/listener of 
a statement is obligated to process a statement’s salient meaning.  When there is 
compatibility between the contextual information and the salient meaning of the 
utterance, additional processing to obtain meaning is not necessary.  On the other 
hand, if the contextual information is incompatible with the salient meaning of the 
utterance, the salient but inappropriate meaning will be first processed then the 
appropriate, less salient interpretation will be retrieved (Giora & Fein, 1999).   
Because figurative language can be salient (such as with  familiar metaphors or 
conventional modes of expressing sarcasm), one can find instances in which 
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figurative language is read as fast or even more rapidly than literal language.  Thus, 
unlike the standard approach, nonliteral language can be processed more rapidly than 
literal language and, in this way, has similarities to direct access models.    In 
summary, the graded salience model proposes that the temporal processing of 
statements is not guided by the literal vs. non-literal components or fully by the 
contextual characteristics leading up to the particular statement.  The graded salience 
model proposes that the meaning of the statement that is processed first is not 
dependent on whether the statement is figurative or literal, but rather which meaning 
is more familiar and as a result coded within the mental lexicon (Giora & Fein, 1999).   
Constraint Satisfaction Explanations 
According to Katz (2004), Pexman (2008) and others, the pattern of findings 
in which figurative language is sometimes processed more slowly and sometimes 
more rapidly than literal language counterparts can be most parsimoniously explained 
by a constraint satisfaction approach. As explained earlier, this approach holds that 
there need not be necessary conditions to induce a sense of irony (or in fact other 
nonliteral forms of language, such as proverbial language). Rather a set of sufficient 
conditions (or information) can either invite or discourage a specific reading. Access 
of this information occurs continuously in processing with a resolution occurring 
when one interpretation reaches thresholds. If the various sources of information 
point towards one interpretation that resolution occurs rapidly, whereas conflicting 
sources of information require acquisition of additional information before resolution 
occurs (resulting in longer reading times, for instance). According to this position the 
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conflicting literature can be explained by differences in the source and strength of 
information presented in the discourse contexts or associated with the target sentence.  
In this chapter we examine the role of one of the contextual factors that have 
been posited as sufficient for inducing a sense of irony, namely negative tension.  
Negativity’s Role in Temporal Processing of Irony: Based upon the implicit display 
model, Utsumi (2000), Ivanko and Pexman (2003) predicted that the processing times 
for irony would be faster when the contextual information and the target statement fit 
the more prototypical characteristics of irony.  Recall that the implicit display model 
proposes that a prototypical ironic environment contains failed expectation and 
negative tension on the part of the speaker as a result of those failed expectations.  
According to Utsumi (2000), implicit display theory can explain the disparate 
findings in the literature, in a manner compatible to that proposed by constraint 
satisfaction theorists.  Utsumi  proposes that the equal reading times between literal 
and ironic statements found in the Gibb’s study can be explained by assuming that 
sarcastic sentences which are highly prototypical ironies and which are embedded 
within negative contexts are identified easily as ironic. That is he claims that Gibbs 
presented items within a prototype representation of an ironic environment. As such 
these items are therefore processed with little to no time difference when compared to 
the literally appropriate statements.  In contrast, Utsumi claims the observation that 
ironic utterances sometimes take longer to process than their literal counterpart occurs 
when the ironic context is not very strong (i.e., is a poor representation of an ironic 
environment), a condition that presumably would be found in Dews and Winner.  
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There is, to our knowledge, only one test of Utsumi’s theoretical explanation. 
Ivanko and Pexman (2003) created a set of stimuli in which the contexts were ‘‘strong’’ 
or ‘‘weak’’ or ‘‘neutral’’ indicators of the negativity associated with irony. Targets were 
ironic or literal statements within that context by altering one word.  To make the stimuli 
appropriate for online methodology, an additional neutral sentence was added at the end 
of each textoid, to study any ‘‘spill-over’’ effect.  Two examples of the textoids used in 
Ivanko and Pexman (2003) and presented here.  
Sam agreed to pick Christopher up after school. Sam never arrived to pick up 
Christopher and never called to say why / Sam arrived 1 hour late and apologized / 
Sam and Christopher talked about the dance on Friday. The next day Christopher 
is explaining to Jodi what happened. Christopher says: 
Ironic statement: Sam is a nice friend. 
Literal statement: Sam is a rotten friend. 
Wrap-up sentence: Christopher and Jodi were walking home from school. 
Terri agreed to help Joan with the toy drive on Saturday. Terri spent the entire 
day socializing / Terri spent half the day socializing / Terri spent some of her time 
helping. The next day Joan is explaining to Sara what happened. Joan says: 
Ironic statement: Terri is a super helper. 
Literal statement: Terri is a lazy helper. 
Wrap-up sentence: The toy drive lasted from dawn until dusk. 
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In both examples above the first version was considered as strongly negative, the second 
as the weak negative and the last sentence as neutral. Recall the prediction arising from 
implicit display theory is that the strongly negative sentence should be read more quickly 
than the weakly negative sentence.  In fact, Ivanko and Pexman (2003) found that the 
sarcastic target utterances presented in a weakly negative context condition were read 
more quickly than a sarcastic target placed within a strongly negative context, a finding 
arguably inconsistent with the predictions made with Utsumi’s implicit display theory.  
  One can question whether in fact Ivanko and Pexman (2003) provided an 
adequate test of Utsumi (2000).  For one, the target sentences differed from one another 
and this almost certainly added variability to the data.  More importantly, as Ivanko and 
Pexman point out, the negative contexts they employed may have been too negative, so 
the implicit display of the speakers’ disappointment is not possible and consequently 
this makes the weakly negative context a better example of prototypic irony.  
  The database created here presents us with a stronger way to test Utsumi’s 
theory. Recall that participants generated a large number of contexts to ensure that 
some statements would likely be perceived as sarcastic. These statements were rated on 
a series of dimensions, including negative tension and sarcasm. From this database we 
can select items in which the exact same target statement is employed, but in which the 
generated contexts differ in rated negative tension. Moreover, the ironic targets can be 
chosen as equally sarcastic in that context, as accessed off-line. Choosing targets in this 
manner has two advantages. First, any differences in reading times could not be 
attributed to differences in target sarcasm (as is the possibility in Ivanko and Pexman) 
but would be attributable to negative tension alone. Second, choosing items in this 
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manner is a better means of ensuring that Utsumi’s concept of an ironic environment is 
satisfied. The key prediction would be that highly sarcastic items within a high negative 
tension context would provide a more prototypical ironic environment and hence 
should lead to a faster resolution of the sarcastic intent than would the sarcastic items in 
a low negative tension context. Providing the same target when used literally would 
permit us to see if indeed the literal and sarcastic senses would be accessed equally 
rapidly, as suggested by Utsumi’s analysis of Gibbs.  
In addition to providing a stronger test of implicit display, a second novel aspect 
of our study compared to Ivanko and Pexman (2003) is that we identified the critical 
word within each target sentence.  The critical word is defined as that point in the 
sentence where either a non-sarcastic (literal) or a sarcastic interpretation is invited; 
up to that point all the words in the target sentence are the same.  It is when reading 
the critical word that the reader should be able to start distinguishing the sentence as 
either a sarcastic one or a literal one and it is at this point any differences in negative 
tension should arise.  Much like in Ivanko and Pexman (2003), each target sentence 
will be followed by a final sentence, in order to accurately measure any potential 
spillover effect.  
In summary, we will establish the participants’ reading patterns for the target 
utterances to determine if they differ based upon the contexts associated with the 
statements.  There will be three types of contexts that surround the target sentences: 
Literal, Low Negative Tension and High Negative Tension.  The target sentences will 
be the same regardless of the context.  For example, the target utterance “This room 
is totally clean” will be placed in a literal context, a sarcastic context with low 
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negative tension, and a sarcastic context with high negative tension (see next section 
for full examples of each).  The level of negativity and the level of sarcasm will be 
based upon the ratings established in the earlier ratings task from Chapter 2.  
Method 
Participants 
 Forty-five (29 female) undergraduates from the University of Western Ontario 
who were enrolled in Introductory Psychology were tested and received 1 course 
participation credit in return.  The average of the participants was 22.6 years (S.D. = 
2.3).   
Materials 
 The stimuli for this experiment included 2 practice items, 21 target items and 
4 filler items.  Of the 25 test items there were 21 target paragraphs and 4 filler 
paragraphs.  The 21 target paragraphs were comprised of 7 examples each from the 
three types of contexts manipulated here (Literal, sarcastic-Low Negative, and 
Sarcastic-High Negative Tension).  Participants completed the study on a computer, 
using the spacebar on the keyboard the advance the words in each sentence. The 
stimuli were programmed using e-prime software and were presented in a word by 
word moving windows paradigm.  The critical word for each target sentence was 
identified and agreed upon to a level of 100% by myself and two other independent 
researchers prior to the analysis.   
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The following are examples of the target sentences with the identified critical 
words in bold: 
 “I did great on the test.” 
“This room is totally clean.” 
“She is a terrific help.” 
The 21 target items were taken from the Context Generation Study reported in 
Chapter 2.  The level of negativity was one of the scales measured in Study 2, in 
which participants rated each item on several scales.  The high-negative items were 
items that received ratings of 5, 6, or 7 on the negativity scale.  The low-negative 
items were items that received 3, 2, or 1 on the negativity scale.  All of these items 
though were rated as having a high level of sarcastic meaning by participants in Study 
2.  In other words, all items were rated by the participants in Study 2 as either a 5, 6 
or 7 on the 8-point sarcasm scale.  The items for both the low negative and high 
negative groups had similar ratings on the other conditions (allusion to failed 
expectations; presence of a victim; and pragmatic insincerity).  All of these conditions 
had a mean of around 5.5 rating on these conditions.  Therefore, the only condition 
that was manipulated in the sense of being significantly different between the two 
contextually negative groups was level of negative tension.  Thereby this ensures that 
it is the level of negativity being measured rather than other conditions having an 
impact on the processing of the target sentences.  
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Example items from each context (see Appendix for all items used): 
Literal 
Sammy’s mother asked him to clean up his room again. 
Sammy put on some music, rolled up his sleeves and got to work. 
After an hour she enters Sammy’s room and says, 
“This room is totally clean!” 
Sammy’s mother closed the door and went downstairs. 
 
Low Negative 
Sammy’s mother asked him to clean up his room again. 
Sammy did not clean his room. Sammy tidied, but his room is still messy. 
After an hour she enters Sammy’s room and says, 
“This room is totally clean!” 
Sammy’s mother closed the door and went downstairs. 
 
High Negative 
Sammy’s mother asked him to clean up his room again. 
Sammy's room looked like a tornado had hit it. Sammy went to his room and 
just listened to the "Ramones" on his headphones 
After an hour she enters Sammy’s room and says, 
“This room is totally clean!” 
Sammy’s mother closed the door and went downstairs. 
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Procedure 
A standard moving windows procedure was employed. Participants were 
instructed to read several short paragraphs on a computer, at a natural pace, 
advancing the text word by word by pressing the spacebar on the keyboard provided.  
The participants were also informed that after each paragraph they would be asked a 
“yes” or “no” question regarding what they just read.  The reason for the inclusion of 
the “yes or no” question following each paragraph was to ensure that the participant 
attended to, and understood, the text.  
  Each of the paragraphs was presented on the computer monitor as a series of 
dashes for each word.  Participants pressed the spacebar on the keyboard to reveal 
each word in the paragraph and replace the previous word with dashes.  After the last 
word of the paragraph was read, the “yes” or “no” question regarding that particular 
paragraph was presented on screen.  The participant pressed the “f” button on the 
keyboard for a “yes” response and the “j” button for a “no” response.  The paragraphs 
were presented in random order.  The entire procedure lasted approximately 30 
minutes.  Ninety-two percent of the “yes or no” questions were answered correctly, 
the 8% of items that were answered incorrectly were removed from the analysis.  
Results and Discussion  
 In order to try and clearly establish a reading pattern for each item, seven 
regions of reading times were identified and analyzed.  The seven word regions 
focused on were:  the word preceding the target sentence critical word, the critical 
word itself, and to examine any spillover effect, regardless of where the critical word 
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fell within the target sentence, the five words that followed it were included in the 
analysis. 
An ANOVA was performed to compare the effect of context on the reading 
times of the target sentences embedded within low-negative sarcastic contexts, high-
negative sarcastic contexts and literal contexts.  The reading patterns for the three 
groups across the seven regions are plotted in Figure 1. The overall reading times for 
the 3 context groups showed no significant difference. Looking specifically at the 7 
critical regions, the three groups of contexts showed no significant difference in 
reading times for the word prior to the critical word in the sentence, or the critical 
word or the third to fifth word following the critical word.  The three groups did, 
however, show a significant difference in reading times at the 1st and 2nd word regions 
which immediately followed the critical word in the target statements.   
First Word after Critical Word 
 For the first word after the critical word region, the ANOVA showed a main 
effect for context, F (2, 43) = 4.039, p < 0.05, with the low-negative items being 
significantly slower than the other two types of contexts for the first word following 
the critical word.  The means for the low-negative contexts were (M = 468.2 msec., 
SD = 183.63 msec.), for the high-negative contexts (M = 432.83, SD = 141.70), and 
for the literal contexts (M = 434.36, SD = 158.72). Tukey post-hoc comparisons of 
the three groups indicate that the low-negative group (M = 468.2 msec., SD = 183.63 
msec.) took significantly longer to read than the literal group (M = 434.36, SD = 
158.72) and the high negative group (M = 432.83, SD = 141.70).   
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Second Word after Critical Word 
 For the second word after the critical word region, the ANOVA also showed a 
main effect of context F (2, 43) = 6.357, p < 0.05.  The low-negative context items 
were once again significantly slower than the other two types of context for this 
region.  The mean for the low-negative contexts were (M = 491.43, SD = 161.42), 
compared with high-negative (M = 443.27, SD = 130.68) and the literal (M = 457.97, 
SD = 127.69). Tukey post-hoc comparisons of the three groups indicate that the low-
negative group (M = 491.43, SD = 161.42) took significantly longer to read than the 
literal group (M = 443.27, SD = 130.68)  and the high negative group (M = 457.97, 
SD = 127.69).   
As can be seen in Figure 1, and according to the ANOVA, the reading times for 
the three groups return to having no significant differences by the third word after the 
target sentence’s critical word.  There was no significant difference in reading times 
leading up to and including the critical word, showing equal reading time to that 
point.  The means for the slower reading times following the critical word are 
generally indicative of what is called a spill-over effect during online processing.  
This spill-over effect is typically explained as an index of the continuing processing 
engendered by the critical word.  As applied here, the continuing processing would 
indicate an attempt by participants to resolve an ambiguity: which of the two 
meanings, literal or sarcastic, is more appropriate in the context.  Thus participants 
here have more difficulty in resolving the sarcastic intend when placed in a low 
negative tension context. However, within two words following the critical word the 
ambiguity is resolved (i.e. by the fourth word, the spill-over effect passed and the 
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reading times were once again comparable for all three groups). This fairly quick 
resolution of ambiguity is not surprising given that, off line, all the targets used 
ironically were rated as equally sarcastic. 
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Figure 1  
Reading Times Across the 7 regions for the 3 Types of Context 
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In conclusion, these data provide strong support for Utsumi’s (2000) theoretical 
position. We now examine these implications for the more general models of 
figurative language processing. Recall first the standard pragmatic approach, in which 
it is claimed that it is necessary for individuals to process the literal meaning of an 
utterance  (see Dews & Winner, 1999; Schwoebel, Dews, Winner & Sriniva, 2000), 
and hence should be read more rapidly than a non-literal sense.  This model is not 
supported here given that the exact same items placed in a high negative tension 
context and a literal supportive context were read exactly at the same rate. Again, 
because the same items were employed in all three experimental conditions the data 
cannot be explained by recourse to graded salience theory. 
In contrast, these data are supportive of either direct access or constraint 
satisfaction models. Recall that the claim of direct access models of figurative 
language processing is that the contextual information available prior to the 
processing of the target sentence permits the reader access to the figurative meaning 
of the statement directly. Constraint satisfaction models propose the weighting of 
supportive and disconfirming information determines the speed of resolution.  Gibbs’ 
(1986) claim is that literal language need not have processing priority, a position also 
held by constraint satisfaction models.  Thus both of these positions are supported 
here and these data do not provide a way of disentangling between them.  
  The data thus in general support the prediction put forth by others (Ivanko & 
Pexman, 2003; Utsumi, 2000) that the level of negativity found in the contextual 
information impacts the processing times of sarcastic utterances. However, our 
findings are directly opposite to that found in Ivanko and Pexman ((2003), given  we 
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found facilitated reading when negative tension was high whereas the locus of their 
positive effects were with low negative contexts.  At this point one cannot definitively 
explain why these differences in findings occurred, especially given the large 
differences in stimuli and procedures employed.   We do feel confident however that 
what we provide here is a fair and strong test of Utsumi’s position, with  target 
statements being equally sarcastic and not differing lexically and other known 
contextual factors  (such as differences in failed expectation or presence of a victim) 
being kept constant across scenarios.  
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CHAPTER SIX: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The research in this thesis was designed to address two key areas related to the 
study of figurative language processing studies.  The first question investigated is: “are 
there necessary contextual components of sarcastic utterances and if so, what are they?   
The second area was to provide an instance of the utility of the database obtained in 
answering the first set of questions by asking; “Does negative tension facilitate the 
processing of sarcastic statements” 
Review of Theoretical Issues 
The search for necessary contextual components associated with sarcastic verbal 
irony has led to various theories of sarcasm comprehension. Identification and 
comprehension of contextual components are central to many of the theories concerning 
verbal irony communication (see Implicit Display Model; Pragmatic Insincerity Model; 
and the Allusional Pretense Model).  Each of these theories predicts different 
combinations of components as necessary for the comprehension of verbal irony.  The 
studies provided in this thesis give a new approach to measuring the presence of these 
conditions and provides insight as to whether the presence of these conditions should be 
deemed necessary or just probable.  We feel this gives us a clear measure as to whether 
the conditions predicted by these models are necessary for the successful comprehension 
of sarcasm. We find that in fact none of the putative “necessary” conditions are in fact 
necessary though each is a probabilistic indicator of sarcastic intent.  As such, the data 
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presented here is in a general sense supportive of a constraint satisfaction approach to 
nonliteral language comprehension.  
 We study also in depth a theoretical implication derived from the implicit display 
theory in an online reading study. The predictions  that follow from this theory  is that the 
level of contextual negativity present in an ironic environment will prime the 
reader/listener to anticipate the forthcoming use of sarcastic verbal irony to the point 
where successful comprehension takes place in a pattern similar to that of the 
comprehension of the literal counterpart. The one previous study in the literature 
examining this prediction found negativity to be important, but not in manner predicted 
by implicit display theory. We provide here a stronger and better controlled test of the 
theory and find support for the predicted role of negative tension. The findings here were 
also compatible with direct access models and with constraint satisfaction models but not 
with the standard pragmatic approach.  
Summary of Results 
 The primary purpose of Study 1 was to investigate the necessary conditions of a 
sarcastic context using a unique experimental approach.  Previous studies investigating 
the necessary conditions of figurative language comprehension generally provided pre-
conceived contexts.  A unique aspect of Study 1 was that the participants themselves 
developed the contexts that would successful convey either a meaningful statement or a 
statement with a sarcastic meaning.  The goal of implementing this task was to try and 
establish whether there are certain necessary conditions that need to be present within 
sarcastic contexts.  
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To determine if the participants were successful in producing meaningful and 
sarcastic contexts a blind coder was hired to code the results.  The key components of a 
sarcastic context based upon the theories are Allusion to failed expectations; Negative 
tension; Pragmatic insincerity; and Presence of a victim.  The coding on the contexts 
created in study 1 gave some support to the predictions put forth by the theories inasmuch 
as each of the predicted components was present in the sarcastic contexts.  There was also 
a significant difference in the contexts created to produce literal statements compared to 
those created to produce sarcastic ones.  The purpose of Study 2 was to determine 
whether the identified and theoretically based components were necessary for creating a 
sense of sarcasm or were they only sufficient. We argue that necessity would be obtained 
if items rated at the highest levels of the proposed components were found at the highest 
levels of sarcasm and absent from the lowest levels of rated sarcasm.  In none of the 
analyses were all the proposed components found to be necessary.  Indeed, often only one 
of the so-called necessary components would be found with high levels of sarcasm. We 
take these findings as indicating that each of the theoretically identified components  are 
sufficient or “probable” or likely  indicators of sarcastic intent rather than being a 
member of a strictly necessary set of conditions for sarcastic comprehension.  The 
general conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that the conditions that are 
claimed to be necessary by the extant psychological theories of sarcasm are often present 
in sarcastic contexts but do not appear to be necessary per se.  
 The overall findings from Study 2 are thus supportive of the constraint 
satisfaction model. The constraint satisfaction model proposes that different sources of 
information are continually being considered and integrated during cognitive processing 
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(see Gibbs, 2001 analysis of Katz and Ferretti’s 2001 proposal).  In the constraint 
satisfaction view, constraining information interacts to provide the individual with 
probabilistic evidence to support one alternative over another, with the competition being 
determined when one alternative (e.g. nonliteral or literal) fits best (Gibbs, 2001). The 
constraint satisfaction model has previously been applied to other types of figurative 
language such as proverbs and metaphors (e.g. Katz & Ferretti, 2001).  In the case of the 
studies reported here, a constraint satisfaction approach would be that the reader or 
listener uses contextual information to determine the probability of alternative meanings 
(literal vs. sarcastic).  Therefore, according to this view, it is not 1 or 2 specific necessary 
conditions that need to be present to determine sarcasm but rather any number of clues 
could summate to allow for the reader/listener to weigh one alternative over the other.  In 
the case of these studies, as long as one of the conditions is strong  enough (or a set of 
weak ones summate) to push the reader to the figurative or sarcastic meaning alternative, 
then that is all that is needed for successful sarcastic comprehension.  The concept of 
confirmation bias may seem to be present in the structure of the ratings study, due to the 
fact that we limited our scales to investigate the presence of proposed necessary 
conditions. However, given the open nature of the context completion task, a logical first 
step was to find if the proposed necessary conditions were present in those open, sarcastic 
contexts.  From here, one can investigate any number of factors that may or may not be 
involved in the contextual components of a sarcastic utterance, that is one of the strengths 
of having a unbiased context generation/completion task to create a testing corpus. 
The primary purpose of Study 3 was to investigate the temporal processing of 
sarcastic utterances in comparison with literal items using the data base provided in the 
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earlier studies.   That is, the reading study employed judiciously selected material to 
demonstrate the utility of these materials to examine important theoretical questions in 
the field. In the illustrative case, the role of negative tension was examined, and 
demonstrated comprehension delays (as determined by elevated reading times) for 
sarcastic utterances embedded within low negative contextual information. In contrast the 
same items embedded in a high negative tension context displayed reading patterns 
indistinguishable from the same target sentence used literally.  This study not only 
provided direct support for one of the predictions of implicit display theory, and 
demonstrated additional utility for the database generated here but, arguably, also 
provides data compatible again with a constraint satisfaction interpretation of sarcasm 
processing.  
Constraint Satisfaction 
Recall that the constraint satisfaction approach is that comprehension of language 
involves constructing a meaning that fits the available information in a way that is 
superior to alternative interpretations.  The most likely or “best” interpretation of a 
statement is the one that provides the most coherent account of what is being 
communicated.  Understanding an ironic/sarcastic utterance according to this view 
requires people to consider different linguistic information that leads to the best fit for 
what the speaker is trying to say (Gibbs, 2001).   
 In terms of the online processing findings from study 3, the constraint satisfaction 
could be used to help explain the results.  It could be argued that the higher level of 
negativity provides the reader with the information that pushes them towards the sarcastic 
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meaning being the best fit possible given the situation. Likewise, for the literal items, the 
contextual information provided leads the reader towards expecting a literal statement 
given the situation and the information. For the low negative items, the contextual 
negativity and the accompanying information don’t provide enough of an immediate push 
for the reader to expect a sarcastic statement and therefore the reading times for those 
target statements were slower than both the high negative items and the literal items for 
the key processing regions.   
 More specifically, it could be argued that the level of negativity found in the 
“high” negativity items are at an optimum level to induce the expectation of a sarcastic 
statement rather than the literal counterpart. Therefore, constraints against the literal 
interpretation are in place and strong enough that the best fit meaning for the reader on 
the high negative context items is a sarcastic meaning.  The results of the context 
preparing the reader for the potential usage of sarcasm is that the sarcastic target 
statements are processed at equal rates as literal target statements in the literal context 
items.  
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
 Although the LIWC is not specifically designed to measure differences in 
figurative language characteristics, the tool did provide some interesting findings when 
utilized to analyze the generated contexts provided by the two instructional groups 
(sarcastic vs. open). The objective measure determined that linguistic characteristics 
associated with the generated contexts of the two instructional groups differed in 31 of 
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the categories. The contexts that invited a sarcastic reading differed from those that did 
not in terms of both linguistic variables and those based on judged characteristics.  
 The main overall LIWC finding was that the words used in the generated sarcastic 
contexts differed from the words used in the non-sarcastic contexts and that these 
differences were consistent with the explanations put forth by the sarcastic verbal irony 
theories investigated. For example the LIWC analysis found that sarcastic contexts were 
higher in negative language than their literal counterparts, this is consistent with Utsumi’s 
implicit display model.  
An interesting finding to come out of the above studies was that by giving 
instructions to generate sarcastic contexts led to higher sarcasm ratings even when the 
ratings for the necessary components were Low-Low.  Why did this occur? Is it possibly 
due to a use of different language, language that could be indexed by the LIWC?  To 
investigate this possibility further we ran the low-low items from both of the instructional 
groups (sarcastic and open) through the LIWC measures.  Significant differences were 
found between the sarcastic and open instruction groups in 16 of the LIWC categories 
(see Appendix C).  A slightly lower number than the number categories that differed 
when we analyzed all of the items produced by both the sarcasm and open instruction 
groups but a similar pattern in terms of the types of categories that were significantly 
different.  There were several key categories that were once again significantly different, 
specifically the categories like negations; negative emotions; anger; and sadness. These 
were significantly higher in the sarcastic instruction group, compared to the open 
instruction. Therefore, the sarcastic instruction participants seemed to be more willing or 
more compelled to include negative words in their contexts compared to those 
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participants in the open instruction group.  It is interesting that once again a level of 
negativity seems to be somehow relevant to the contextual make up of sarcastic 
contextual information.  This difference in use of negative language found by the LIWC 
would be a very interesting area to investigate further in future studies. 
While it is too early to say that the LIWC can detect sarcasm, it at the very least 
did show significant differences between the contextual characteristics used to convey 
sarcasm in comparison to the literal counterparts.  If this type of objective result was 
consistently found and replicated it could be logically theorized that the LIWC could be 
modified to accurately detect sarcastic contexts. At the very least, the LIWC findings 
from this research show that it could be useful tool in investigating characteristics of the 
contexts associated with figurative vs. literal language.  
Future Directions 
 One interesting future project based on this research would be to utilize the 
generated contexts into a production task, whereby the participants see the contexts and 
must now produce the target statements.  This would be more consistent with the 
experimental design used by researchers in the area, the caveat being that the contexts 
now used in the production task were created by other participants, not the experimenters 
themselves.  This would be of interest due to the fact that it would mean that both the 
accompanying contexts and the statements themselves would be produced by participants 
rather than experimenters themselves.  It would be interesting to see if the statements 
produced by the participants in such a study were consistent with what the theories 
surrounding sarcastic verbal irony would predict. More specifically, if participants were 
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just given the generated contexts in isolation and asked to produce meaningful responses, 
would they produce sarcastic statements? This would be an interesting next phase of 
investigation not only to substantiate whether this corpus of generated items could alone 
produce sarcastic statements but also because there currently are only a limited number of 
sarcasm production studies of any type and this could help fill the gap that currently 
exists in the literature.  
 It would also be interesting to address the findings from Colston (2000) that were 
discussed earlier. Recall that Colston claims that intentional violations of Grice’s maxims 
can contribute to the listener identifying a statement as having an ironic meaning. 
According to Colston (2000), this intentional violation of one or more of the Gricean 
conversational maxims, in combination with the portrayal of a contrast between 
expectations and reality, the speaker and context are priming the listener to anticipate a 
sarcastic utterance.  Using the corpus of generated contexts from this research, one could 
identify whether violations of any of the Gricean conversation maxims are present and if 
so do they contribute to the sarcasm scores.  To be consistent with the claims in Colston 
(2000), these contextual items that showed an intentional violation of Gricean maxims 
would also have to be rated “high” in the category of failed expectations.   By taking the 
set of contexts produced, it may be possible to investigate if the violation of these 
maxims significantly impact the level of sarcasm found in the target statements.  It should 
be noted that Colston (2000) also cautioned against the viability of a single account of 
verbal irony comprehension. It could be argued that the findings from the studies 
presented in this paper support that final claim. 
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 Further investigation into the online processing patterns would also be interesting.  
The findings from this study support the claim that level of negativity plays a role in 
priming the reader for sarcastic verbal irony, but what other factors could also play a 
similar role?  Future experiments investigating the potential role of other contextual 
components could help further the understanding of what factors shift our processing 
patterns of literal and figurative utterances.   
 It would also be interesting to utilize that data set created by these studies to test 
specifically the constraint satisfaction models.  This could be done by systematically 
manipulating factors that point towards a sarcastic response and those that introduce 
ambiguity.  The data set produced here could provide the starting point of such an 
investigation that hasn’t been present in other investigations focused on the predictions 
put forth by the constraint satisfaction model.  
 Another interesting area of investigation would be to study other populations of 
subjects.  The majority of the subjects in this study were undergrad students of a certain 
age range. Would the findings differ if the subjects were from different age or cultural 
populations? This would especially be of interest to those who believe that our usage and 
criteria of sarcasm is ever evolving and changing. Perhaps then young undergrad students 
have a different sense of sarcasm compared to older non-University students. 
Conclusion 
The research reported in the current thesis was an early attempt at providing a 
more empirically driven understanding of what contextual components are utilized in 
the conveying of sarcastic verbal irony.  The contradiction between the surface and 
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intended meanings associated with sarcastic statements have long motivated 
researchers to attempt to clarify how we use this communication technique.  The 
contextual generation approach was applied in such a way as to help answer some of 
the questions researchers of figurative language and the use of sarcastic verbal irony 
more specifically.  We find that extant theories have identified factors of importance 
but not, as claimed necessary factors. Instead the data all point to these factors 
working as pointers towards a sarcastic interpretation, none of which by itself is 
necessary to create that sense.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
 
 
References 
Colston, H. (2000). On the necessary conditions for verbal irony comprehension. 
 Pragmatics and Cognition, 8, 277-324.   
Gibbs, R.W. (1986). On the psycholinguistics of sarcasm.  Journal of Experimental 
 Psychology: General, 115, 3-15.  
Gibbs, R.W. (1994). The Poetics of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Gibbs, R.W. (2001). Evaluating contemporary models of figurative language 
 understanding. Metaphor and Symbol, 16(3&4), 317–333 
Giora, R. (2003). On our mind: Salience, context and figurative language. New York: 
 Oxford University Press.  
Giora, R., & Fein, O. (1999). Irony: Context and salience. Metaphor and Symbol, 14, 
 241-257.  
Gibbs, R.W. & Colston, H. (2007). Irony in Language and Thought. New York: 
 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Ivanko, L. S., & Pexman, M. P. (2003). Context incongruity and irony processing.  
 Discourse Processes, 35, 241-279. 
Katz, A. N., & Ferretti, T. R. (2001). Moment-By-Moment Reading of 
96 
 
 
 Proverbs in Literal and Nonliteral Contexts. Metaphor and Symbol, 16(3&4), 
 193–221. 
Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg & Brown (1995).  How about another piece of pie: 
 The allusional pretense theory of discourse irony. Journal of Experimental 
 Psychology: General, 124, 2-21.   
Lee, C., & Katz, A.N. (1998). The differential role of ridicule in sarcasm and irony. 
 Metaphor & Symbol, 13(1), 1-15. 
Pennebaker, J. W., Francis ME, Booth RJ. (2001). Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
 (LIWC): LIWC2001. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
Pexman, P.M., Ferretti, T.R., & Katz, A.N. (2000). Discourse factors that influence 
 online reading of metaphor and irony. Discourse Processes, 29, 201-222. 
Pexman, P.M.,(2010). It’s Fascinating Research: The cognition of verbal irony. 
 Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17(4), 286-290. 
Utsumi, A. (2000).  Verbal irony as implicit display of ironic environment: 
 Distinguishing ironic utterances from nonirony.  Journal of Pragmatics, 32, 
 1777-1806.  
 
 
 
97 
 
 
Appendix A: Items Used in the Context Generation Task 
 
1.  
Stan and Jennifer had just finished the exam. 
Jennifer turns to Stan and says,  
“I did great on that test.” 
 
2.  
Amanda was volunteering at the toy drive. 
Laura says to Paul,  
“Amanda sure is a terrific help!” 
 
3.   
Chris and Tracy are getting ready to have a picnic.  
Tracy turns to Chris and says,  
“What a lovely day for a picnic.” 
 
4.  
Sheila’s boyfriend Walter arrived home from work. 
Sheila says to Walter,  
“You are in a pleasant mood today.” 
5.  
Jean and her husband Frank were leaving the fancy dinner party. 
As they were leaving someone said to Frank,  
98 
 
“You sure were the hit of the party!” 
6. 
Sammy’s mother asked him to clean up his room again. 
After an hour she enters Sammy’s room and says,  
“This room is totally clean!” 
 
7. 
Jesse and Mark just found out that Brenda got the job promotion.  
Jesse says to Mark,  
“She totally deserved it.” 
 
8. 
Julie and Cindy arrive at the party. 
Cindy says to Julie,  
“This is going to be a great party.” 
 
9. 
Michael and Sandra are driving through the city.  
Michael says to Sandra,  
“I love when people use their signals.” 
 
10. 
Margaret and Diane were eating at a formal dinner party.  
Diane says to Margaret,  
“You have wonderful table manners.” 
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11. 
Harry was helping Diane move her grandfather’s clock.  
Diane stops and says to Harry,  
“You are really helping me out.” 
 
12. 
Maurice was opening another letter from a University in response to grad school 
applications. 
After reading it, he turned to Tom and said,  
“Looks like I am every school’s first choice.”  
 
13.  
Sally came home from a job interview.  
Sally says to Ian,  
“This job has absolutely the best pay.” 
 
14. 
Alfred and Maggie decide to eat at a new restaurant they have heard a lot about.  
During the meal Maggie says to Alfred,  
“What incredible food they serve.” 
 
15. 
Harry and Ron were waiting at the baggage claim for their luggage.  
Ron says to Harry,  
“That was a fantastic flight.” 
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16. 
Larry made Sally a stew for dinner. 
Sally took a bite and said to Larry,  
“You sure are a great cook.” 
 
17. 
Paul’s boss walked by his office while he was sitting at his desk. 
His Boss stopped and said,  
“Don’t work so hard.” 
 
18. 
Ken went to a new barber for a haircut. 
After he was done Ken said to the barber,  
“Thanks for a great haircut.” 
 
19. 
Chris and John waited in line 3 hours to see a movie. 
After the movie John said to Chris,  
“That was worth waiting for.” 
 
 
20. 
Anne promised to keep her party dress clean. 
When she arrived home her mom said,  
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“Thanks for keeping so clean.” 
 
21. 
George and Betty decided to go to a birthday party. 
When they arrived Betty said to George,  
“It is really crowded in here.” 
22.  
Stan and Jennifer had just finished the exam. 
Jennifer turns to Stan and says, 
“I did great on that test.” 
23.  
Chris and Tracy are getting ready to have a picnic. 
Tracy turns to Chris and says, 
“What a lovely day for a picnic.” 
24.  
Maurice was opening another letter from a University in response to grad school 
applications. 
After reading it, he turned to Tom and said, 
“Looks like I am every school’s first choice.” 
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Appendix B: LIWC Analysis for Generated Contexts 
L.I.W.C. factors that were significantly different but did not reach 3% cutoff. 
 
Group  
Factor Sarcastic Open F 
Family 0.12 0.43 9.35* 
Friends 0.12 0.32 8.85* 
Sadness 1.67 0.20 88.40** 
Anger 0.91 0.41 8.38* 
Anxiety 0.64 0.32 4.08* 
Certainty 0.88 1.61 20.50** 
Feel 0.94 1.51 12.69** 
Bio 2.93 2.28 7.88* 
Body 0.96 0.62 9.83* 
Sexual 0.04 0.20 7.06* 
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Ingest 1.61 1.24 6.90* 
Motion 1.71 2.78 15.84* 
Money 1.03 0.61 10.87* 
Religion 0.03 0.11 8.11* 
Filler 0.38 0.18 4.46* 
* indicates significant at .05 level; ** indicates significant at the .01 level 
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Appendix C: L.I.W.C. factors that were significantly different in Low-Low, 
Instructional Analysis 
Group  
Factor Sarcastic Open F 
 
Pronouns 
 
8.8 10.4 9.66* 
Personal 
Pronouns 
5.9 7.6 12.14* 
3rd Person 
Singular 
3.1 5.3 30.39** 
Auxiliary 
Verbs 
11.3 9.6 10.49* 
Past 8.7 10.5 10.33* 
Present 6.6 4.4 20.94* 
Prepositions 9.7 11.9 15.5* 
Negations 3.9 1.6 73.95** 
Social 
Processes 
10.1 12.2 10.45* 
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Positive 
Emotions 
3.2 6.4 56.23* 
Negative 
Emotions 
4.8 1.4 71.4** 
Sadness 1.6 0.3 26.5** 
Causation 0.8 1.2 4.35* 
Certainty 0.9 1.6 11.95* 
Exclusive 3.1 1.4 30.35** 
Feeling 0.9 1.8 14.84* 
* indicates significant at .05 level; ** indicates significant at the .01 level 
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Appedix D: Items Used in the Online Processing Task 
Example High/Strong negative tension: 
Jennifer fell asleep the night before the big exam.  
Stan and Jennifer had just finished the exam. 
Jennifer knew she had not answered one answer properly. 
Jennifer turns to Stan and says,  
“I did great on that test.” 
 
Example Low/Weak Negative tension: 
Stan and Jennifer had just finished the exam. 
Walking out, Jennifer began to regret not studying. 
Jennifer turns to Stan and says,  
“I did great on that test.” 
 
Example of Literal: 
Jennifer had been studying for weeks. 
Stan and Jennifer had just finished the exam. 
Jennifer feels like she did well.  
“I did great on that test.” 
 
Literal 
Sammy’s mother asked him to clean up his room again. 
Sammy put on some music, rolled up his sleeves and got to work. 
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After an hour she enters Sammy’s room and says, 
“This room is totally clean!” 
Sammy’s mother closed the door and went downstairs. 
 
Low Negative 
Sammy’s mother asked him to clean up his room again. 
Sammy did not clean his room. Sammy tidied, but his room is still messy. 
After an hour she enters Sammy’s room and says, 
“This room is totally clean!” 
Sammy’s mother closed the door and went downstairs. 
 
High Negative 
Sammy’s mother asked him to clean up his room again. 
Sammy's room looked like a tornado had hit it. Sammy went to his room and just listened 
to the "Ramones" on his headphones 
After an hour she enters Sammy’s room and says, 
“This room is totally clean!” 
Sammy’s mother closed the door and went downstairs. 
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